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Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a 
theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical 
perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hal-
lucination. The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences 
are relations to mind-independent objects. That is to say, taking ex-
periences to be episodes or events, the naïve realist supposes that 
some such episodes have as constituents mind-independent objects. 
In turn, the disjunctivist claims that in a case of veridical perception 
like this very kind of experience that you now have, the experiential 
episode you enjoy is of a kind which could not be occurring were 
you having an hallucination. The common strategy of arguments 
from hallucination set out to show that certain things are true of 
hallucinations, and hence must be true of perceptions. For example, 
it is argued that hallucinations must have non-physical objects of 
awareness, or that such states are not relations to anything at all, but 
are at best seeming relations to objects. In insisting that veridical 
perceptual experience is of a distinct kind from hallucination, the 
disjunctivist denies that any of these conceptions of hallucination 
challenges our conception of veridical perceptions as  relations to 
mind-independent objects.
More specifically, I assume that the disjunctivist advocates naïve 
realism because they think that this position best articulates how 
sensory experience seems to us to be just through reflection. If the 
disjunctivist is correct in this contention, then anyone who accepts 
the conclusion of the argument from hallucination must also accept 
that the nature of sensory experience is other than it seems to us to 
be. In turn, one may complain that any such error theory is liable to 
lead to sceptical consequences. A Humean scepticism about the 
senses launches a challenge about our knowledge of the world 
through questioning the conception we have of what sense experi-
ence is, and how it can provide knowledge of the world. If the con-
ception one has of how one knows something is falsified, then one’s 
claim to that knowledge can seem to be undermined. We seem to be 
cut off from the world through lacking the kind of contact with it 
that we supposed ourselves to have.
Note that this sceptical problem is not the same as the more fa-
miliar scepticism with regard to the external world associated with 1
M.G.F. Martinthe Meditations. The Cartesian sceptical challenge can be formulated on 
the basis that it is conceivable that one should be in a situation which 
seemed, from the perspective one then occupied, to be no different from 
this situation, even if in that circumstance one cannot know anything 
about the world because one has been deprived of the conditions necessary 
for perceiving and coming to know how things are around one. The chal-
lenge then made is for one to demonstrate to the challenger’s or one’s own 
satisfaction that one does not occupy this situation. The initial hypothesis 
does not require that one make any assumption about the nature of per-
ceptual experiences, and in particular does not require that one assume 
that the very same experiential episodes could occur in hallucination as in 
perception. It would be a mistake, therefore, to suppose that advocating 
disjunctivism might address directly this kind of problem. The disjunctiv-
ist is not concerned with Cartesian scepticism, but rather concerned to de-
fend a common understanding we have of perceptual contact with the 
world, and hence a naïve understanding of how we in a position to know 
about and think of the kinds of objects that we perceive and track through 
the use of our senses. Disjunctivism so conceived is reactive: it blocks a line 
of argument which would threaten to show we have no knowledge of the 
empirical world because we lack the kind of perceptual access to it we sup-
posed ourselves to have. This need not be intended to answer Descartes’s 
challenge, so the proposal should not be assessed by how well or badly it 
does that.
Now one might doubt that this sketch offers a coherent motivation for 
disjunctivism. For example, one might suppose that some form of inten-
tional theory of perception, which emphasises the idea that we can think of 
our perceptual experiences as representational states about or directed on 
the world, is as well placed to articulate our commonsense conception of 
perceiving as naïve realism. Or, one might question whether the kind of 
consequence that rejecting such a commonsense conception of experience 
would have for our understanding of our knowledge of, and reference to, 
the things around us in the environment: so an error theory of perception 
is quite acceptable. But for the sake of this paper, I would like the reader to 
assume that only naïve realism correctly captures the common sense con-
ception of perception; and that rejecting common sense leads to scepti-
cism. For I suspect that there are many philosophers who are inclined to 
think that even if the disjunctivist could establish these concerns as a seri-
ous motivation for the doctrine, still the theory itself would be unaccepta-
ble because of the consequences the theory has elsewhere in our 
conception of the mind; namely in relation to the character of sensory ex-
perience and our awareness of that character.
What I want to do here is to try and articulate somewhat more the kind 
of gut resistance to disjunctivism that many feel (of course I may rather be 2
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here is to try and locate as best I can what should be the most fundamental 
point of disagreement between a disjunctivist position and any of the alter-
natives. From a disjunctivist perspective, resistance to the account will be 
based on a false picture, either of sensory experience, or of the kind of 
knowledge we have of it. If we can locate the place of must fundamental 
disagreement, the disjunctivist will then be placed to try and offer an ex-
planation of why it should seem so counter-intuitive even if true.
In the bulk of the paper I will be taken up with identifying and elabo-
rating the fundamental disagreements here. They will turn on the possibil-
ity according to the disjunctivist that someone should be a certain way 
experientially simply in virtue of their situation being indiscriminable 
through reflection from veridical perception. This seems to describe a situ-
ation, according to the opposing intuition, in which phenomenal con-
sciousness itself has been left out of the picture. In the first part of the 
paper, though, I aim to present in a compact form what I take to be the 
fundamental commitments of disjunctivism. In this part I précis and 
slightly revise material I expand on elsewhere.1 I then turn to the formula-
tion of this worry about the seeming absence of phenomenal conscious-
ness and its relation to older concerns about absent qualia. In turn this 
raises questions about the role of higher-order perspectives in characteris-
ing disjunctivism. I aim to sketch opposing models of how phenomenal 
consciousness and self-awareness fit together. In the brief, final section I 
connect these different models to different reactions to external world 
scepticism.
Part One
1. We can see the distinctive content of disjunctivism about the theory of 
perception as comprising three basic commitments.2 As I will argue, the 
commitment which seems most clearly counter-intuitive is the third of 
these, and our discussion for much of the rest of this paper will focus on 
what is and is not involved in this final commitment. I’ll spell out each of 
the commitments in turn, setting each in the context of motivations for it, 
and exploring some of the consequences, aiming to show that the third 
1. The bulk of this section is an extremely compressed discussion of the first few sections of; (Martin 
2004) and beyond that, Ch. 3 and Ch. 8 of Uncovering Appearances (forthcoming).
2. The disjunctive theory of appearances (such labelling, I think, is due to Howard Robinson in (Rob-
inson 1985), is first propounded by Michael Hinton in(Hinton 1967), and elaborated further in (Hin-
ton 1973); the view was then defended further by Paul Snowdon in (Snowdon 1980-81)and(Snowdon 
1990); and separately by John McDowell in (McDowell 1982); see also (McDowell 1994)and (McDow-
ell 1995). There are significant differences in the formulation and motivation for each of these 
approaches. I discuss a little of this in (Martin 2004).3
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with more familiar elements of disjunctivism.
The first commitment reflects the antecedent acceptance of Naïve Real-
ism. Taking as our starting point one of entirely veridical perception, a vis-
ual perception, say, of a white picket fence as the thing it is, the 
disjunctivist’s first claim is:
(I) No instance of the specific kind of experience I have now, when seeing 
the white picket fence for what it is, could occur were I not to perceive such 
a mind-independent object as this.
We should understand this claim as the rejection of what McDowell calls, 
‘the highest common factor’ view of sense experience.3 A naïve realist view 
of (entirely veridical) perceptual experience is as that of a relation between 
the perceiver and objects of perception. Taking sensory experiences to be 
events, these objects of perception are to be understood as constituents of 
the event in question. The naïve realist supposes it is an aspect of the es-
sence of such experiential episodes that they have such experience-inde-
pendent constituents. 
Naïve realism is commonly taken to be falsified by the argument from 
illusion or hallucination. There are various formulations of the argument, 
few of them valid. For our purposes, we can best understand  it as a form 
of reductio against naïve realism. That is to say, one will argue that the ex-
istence of naïve realist experience is inconsistent with two further claims 
which have broad acceptance: what we might call Experiential Naturalism, 
that our sense experiences are themselves part of the natural causal order, 
subject to broadly physical and psychological causes; the second, Common 
Kind Assumption, that whatever kind of mental, or more narrowly experi-
ential, event occurs when one perceives, the very same kind of event could 
occur were one hallucinating.
In the context of these two assumptions, we can show that veridical 
perception could not be a relation of awareness to mind-independent ob-
jects, as the naïve realist supposes. Either, along with sense-datum theories, 
one holds to the thought that sense experience is relational, and accept that 
its objects must be mind-dependent; or, with representational or inten-
tional theories of perception, one supposes that sense experience itself is 
not strictly a relation to the object of awareness at all, although typically we 
characterise awareness as if it were such a relation. The argument moves 
first through considering what the nature of hallucination must be, given 
Experiential Naturalism, and then generalising from that to the case of ve-
ridical perception, using the Common Kind Assumption.
For, granting Experiential Naturalism, we need simply add the com-
mon observation that it is possible to bring about an hallucinatory experi-
3. See the McDowell works cited in the last footnote.4
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succeeds in producing an hallucination in a subject does not have to in-
duce an appropriate correlation between the subject and any other entities 
beyond the subject’s brain or the mind. Or, if there are such necessary con-
ditions of the occurrence of an hallucinatory experience (that other such 
entities should exist and be suitably related to the experience), then the 
causes of experience must also be sufficient to guarantee that these addi-
tional conditions obtain. From this we can derive the disjunction either 
that hallucinatory experiences lack any constituent elements, and hence 
impose no such necessary conditions on their occurrence, or that the con-
stituent elements they have are themselves constitutively dependent on the 
occurrence of that kind of experience. In such a situation, the causal con-
ditions for experience will be sufficient for it to occur, since bringing about 
such an experience will thereby guarantee the obtaining of what are neces-
sary conditions for it.
Now, suppose for the moment that hallucinatory experiences do meet 
the second of these models: they possess constituent elements which are 
experience-dependent.4 Then, by the Common Kind Assumption, whatev-
er kind of experience does occur when one perceives, the same kind of ex-
perience can be present when one is hallucinating. So if an hallucinatory 
experience must be of a kind which constitutes the existence of its objects, 
then since the very same kind of experience is also present when perceiv-
ing, that too will constitute the existence of its objects. That is, for any as-
pect of the perceptual experience the naïve realist hypothesises to be a 
relation to a mind-independent entity, consideration of the corresponding 
hallucination shows the entity in that case to be mind-dependent, and 
hence that any experience of that kind to thereby have a mind-dependent 
object rather than any mind-independent one.5 Mind-independent enti-
ties cannot then be constituents of the experience, contra the naïve realist. 
This gives the naïve realist reason to reject this conception of hallucina-
tion, a conception familiar from sense-datum accounts, and hence one 
which generally people might construe as implausible anyway. The alter-
native is to deny that the hallucination has any constituent elements. What 
account of hallucination is consistent with this denial? The commonest ap-
proach is to embrace a representationalist or intentionalist construal of ex-
perience. The denial that the experience has any constituent elements must 
be made consistent with the evident fact that, from the subject’s perspec-
tive, it is as if there are various objects of awareness presented as being 
4. This is to conceive of hallucinations along the lines discussed by sense-datum theorists from the sec-
ond-half of the twentieth century on, for example in, (Jackson 1977), (Robinson 1994) and (Foster 
1986).
5. I assume here, in effect, that there cannot be constitutive over-determination of the veridical percep-
tual experience such that it is both a relation to the mind-dependent entity and the mind-independent 
one.5
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such as seemingly viewing a white picket fence, one’s experience has a sub-
ject matter (as we might say), there seemingly is a particular kind of scene 
presented to the subject in having the experience. And it looks as if the de-
scription of this subject matter carries with it a commitment to the exist-
ence of what the naïve realist thinks of as the constituents of experience in 
the case of veridical perception. Since we deny that there are any such con-
stituents of the experience in the hallucinatory case, our talk here must be 
lacking in ontological import. We are treating the hallucinatory experience 
as if it is the presentation of objects when in fact it is not. Intentional theo-
ries of experience take the description of the subject matter of an experi-
ence to express the representational or intentional content of the 
experiential state. The experience has its phenomenal character, according 
to this approach, in virtue of its possession of this content. In general we 
take ascriptions of representational content to psychological states to lack 
ontological commitment.6
Again, by the Common Kind Assumption, whatever kind of experience 
occurs when one perceives, that same kind of event will be present when 
one hallucinates. So if the hallucinatory experience lacks any constituents, 
then the perceptual experience, being of the same kind, does not have any 
constituents either. Although there may be objects which do act as appro-
priate values for our quantifiers, or referents for our terms, when we de-
scribe how things are presented as being to the subject of the perceptual 
state, none of these should be taken actually to be aspects of the experien-
tial state itself, since such a kind of experience can occur when the subject 
is not perceiving. On this view, even in the case of veridical perception, 
when we make mention of the particular objects which the subject is per-
ceiving we do not describe them as parts of the experiential situation, but 
make mention of them to express the representational import of the expe-
rience. Given the naïve realist’s commitment to thinking of perceptual ex-
perience as genuinely relational between the subject and a mind-
independent world, this representationalist construal of hallucination is 
no more amenable to naïve realism than the sense-datum conception.7
So Experiential Naturalism and the Common Kind Assumption taken 
together rule out naïve realism. The only options we would have left then 
would be some form sense-datum theory or representational or intention-
al theory of sense experience, or a combination of the two. To defend naïve 
6. Or rather, more precisely, we may take the ascription to a psychological state of a given representa-
tional content to lack the ontological commitment that assertion of that content (or of a proposition 
corresponding to that content if the content is nonconceptual or non-propositional in form) would 
involve. Some people, however, question whether one can avoid the ontological commitment inherent 
in the use of some referential terms in this way, cf. (McDowell 1984). I assume that those drawn to 
intentional theories of perception will posit representational contents for perceptual states which avoid 
these difficulties. For more on this issue see (Martin 2002).6
On Being Alienatedrealism, we must reject one of the other assumptions. If we do not want to 
deny that experience is part of the natural order, rather than some external 
condition on it, then we cannot abandon Experiential Naturalism.8 Naïve 
realism can be preserved only at the expense of denying the Common Kind 
Assumption. And that is what (I) does. 
There are ways of construing the Common Kind Assumption on which 
it is trivially false. If we relax our conception of a kind of event sufficiently 
then any description of an event mirrors a kind of event. On that concep-
tion, it is easy to find kinds which some individual events fall under and 
otherwise matching individuals fail to. You paint your picket fence white 
on Tuesday and I do so on Wednesday: mine is a Wednesday painting, 
yours a Tuesday one. Given the different descriptions these seem to be dif-
ferent kinds of event. Since no party to the debate about perception denies 
that there are some descriptions true only of the perceptual scenario, 
namely that they are perceptions rather than hallucinations, someone who 
wants to take the Common Kind Assumption to be a significant addition 
to the debate cannot be using this conception of a kind of event.
For the Common Kind Assumption to be a non-trivial falsehood, 
therefore, we need some conception of the privileged descriptions of expe-
riences. For it to be a substantive matter that perceptions fail to be the 
same kind of mental episode as illusions or hallucinations, we need some 
characterisations of events which reflect their nature or what is most fun-
damentally true of them.9 So one might simply reject the whole debate at 
this stage on the basis that there just are no interesting kinds in respect of 
events; and hence no way to discriminate among the descriptions true of 
both perception and matching hallucination and those descriptions true of 
only one. I won’t address such pessimism about the state of debate directly 
here. Rather I will just assume for the sake of this discussion that we can 
make sense of the idea that there are some privileged classifications of indi-
7. To emphasise again: this is to treat naïve realism as committed to the idea that veridical sense experi-
ence is, at least in part, a relation to mind-independent objects. Intentional theories of perception are 
committed to denying the relational nature of such experience, even if they are inclined to describe 
experience as if it were relational. The naïve realist’s commitment to the relational character of experi-
ence cannot be grounded solely in an appeal to the alleged ‘transparency’ of experience: intentional 
theorists typically affirm that too. Rather, the commitment to thinking of veridical perceptual experi-
ence as relational involves a further commitment – to see how that might be grounded in phenomenol-
ogy see (Martin 2002) and Uncovering Appearances, ch. 7.
8. Experiential Naturalism is here conceived as a methodological or regulative assumption of both 
empirical work on sense experience and philosophical discussion of it. The assumption was rejected by 
the early sense-datum theorists (and for that reason the various forms of the argument from hallucina-
tion they employed tended to be invalid) and by some phenomenologists, for example (Merleau-Ponty 
1942). For a more recent discussion which rejects the principle, see (Valberg 1992).
9. Note that this is not the same thing as to assume that the events we are here interested in are them-
selves part of the fundamental furniture of the universe. It is quite consistent with what is claimed here 
that there is a more fundamental level of reality out of which the mental is somehow constructed, or 
out of which it emerges. All that is rejected is that we explain the salience of this level of reality merely 
through appeal to an inclination on our part to describe some things as similar and others as different.7
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sential to a given individual tracks our understanding of the kinds of thing 
it is. That is, I will assume the following: entities (both objects and events) 
can be classified by species and genus; for all such entities there is a most 
specific answer to the question, ‘What is it?’10 In relation to the mental, 
and to perception in particular, I will assume that for mental episodes or 
states there is a unique answer to this question which gives its most specific 
kind; it tells us what essentially the event or episode is. In being a member 
of this kind, it will thereby be a member of other, more generic kinds as 
well. It is not to be assumed that for any description true of a mental event, 
there is a corresponding kind under which the event falls. The Common 
Kind Assumption is then to be taken as making a claim about the most 
specific kind that a perceptual experience is, that events of that specific 
kind can also be hallucinations.11
In rejecting the Common Kind Assumption, the disjunctivist might be 
seeking to deny that there is anything really in common with respect to be-
ing an experience, or being a mental state, which perceptions, illusions and 
hallucinations need have in common. This would be to deny even that the 
idea of a perceptual experience defines a proper mental kind, since all par-
ties to the debate agree that this is a notion we can apply equally to veridi-
cal perceptions, illusions and hallucinations. Yet given that disjunctivism 
seeks to defend naïve realism, the rejection of the Common Kind Assump-
tion only requires that one claim that the most specific kind of experience 
one enjoys when one perceives not occur when having an illusion or hallu-
cination. This claim is the minimum needed to block the entailment from 
the claim that hallucinations cannot have mind-independent objects as 
constituents to the claim that the same is so of veridical perceptions. In this 
manner, the disjunctivist preserves naïve realism through affirming (I) and 
thereby denying the Common Kind Assumption.12
10. The most developed recent treatment of this kind of Aristotelianism about essence and nature is to 
be found in, (Wiggins 1980), and (Wiggins 2001); see also (Wiggins 1996). For more on the question 
of essence see Kit Fine’s discussions of these matters in (Fine 1994)and (Fine 1994).
11. Can one formulate the argument, and the resistance to it, by avoiding mention of kinds? The argu-
ment from hallucination is often presented in terms of the causal conditions for bringing about a given 
instance of perceiving. That is, it is sometimes suggested that the issue turns on whether a given per-
ception could have occurred without being a perception (cf.) (Valberg 1992). But there are many rea-
sons for denying that the very same event could have occurred in a different causal context which have 
nothing to do with the debate about the nature of perception. (Consider Davidson’s original criterion 
of identity for events in (Davidson 1969).) If we do not assume that an individual event of hallucinat-
ing a picket fence is identical with a given perception, some additional principle must be appealed to in 
order to indicate that what is true of the one must be true of the other.
12. As should already be clear from the naïve realist commitment to having entities as constituents of 
perceptual episodes, the disjunctivist must reject any kind of physicalism which identifies kinds of 
mental episode with kinds of physical events in the subject’s brain. In rejecting The Common Kind 
Assumption, the disjunctivist does not take a stance on whether the very same kind of local physical 
conditions can accompany veridical perception and hallucination.8
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ers, but this is not to say that the idea that some sense experiences should 
be relations to objects in the world around us is in itself a bizarre, or coun-
ter-intuitive, suggestion. The endless disputes about externalism and inter-
nalism in relation to psychological states should teach us that there is no 
clear starting point, independent of philosophical conviction, which tells 
us the general form that mental states must take. If one finds something 
puzzling in disjunctivism, then, it is not so much the commitment to naïve 
realism as the consequences that such a commitment imposes on one in 
relation to other cases of sense experience: illusion and hallucination. But 
what is the disjunctivist committed to in relation to these other cases? At 
first sight, it may appear that all that the disjunctivist has to say is some-
thing entirely negative: that these are not cases of having the specific kind 
of experience one has when veridically perceiving. And hence one might 
think that disjunctivism avoids saying anything general about the nature of 
sense experience. In fact there is something more to say here which derives 
from what ought to be common ground to all parties to the debate.
Michael Hinton began the debate about disjunctivism by focusing on a 
certain kind of locution, what he called ‘perception–illusion disjunctions’, 
for example, ‘Macbeth is seeing a dagger or under the illusion of so do-
ing’.13 Hinton’s strategy is to argue that there is no good reason to think 
that these disjunctive statements could not do all the work that our normal 
talk of appearances and experience do. That is, that there is no good reason 
from our ordinary ways of talking to suppose that we are committed to the 
existence of some special kind of experiential event which may be present 
equally in cases of perception and hallucination. Now this strategy 
prompts a question: Why pick on these disjunctions, then, rather than, say, 
‘Either Macbeth is seeing a dagger, or under the illusion of seeing twenty 
three pink elephants’? The answer, I take it, is that the disjunction Hinton 
highlights has the same evidential profile as self-ascriptions of perceptual 
experience. Someone in a position to make a warranted judgement about 
their experience can also put forward one of Hinton’s perception–illusion 
disjunctions, but not so the alternative that we suggested. One can gloss 
this, I suggest, by highlighting the connection between our talk of percep-
tual experience and the epistemic position a subject is in with respect to his 
or her perceptions and certain illusions or hallucinations, that they are in-
discriminable from the perceptions through introspective reflection.
Suppose you start out only with the notion of veridical perception, 
what could introduce you to the idea of sensory experience more generally, 
to include illusion and hallucination? Even if we are not engaged with Car-
13. See the works cited in above in footnote two.9
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ducing the idea. Consider your current perception of the environment 
around you. Perhaps you are staring out at a late spring evening; or lying in 
summer grass; or sitting in a dusky office reading a philosophy paper. It is 
quite conceivable for you that there should be a situation in which you 
could not tell that things were not as they are now: so it might seem to you 
as if you were then staring at a white picket fence, or taking in the smell of 
new mown grass, even though you unknown to you in that situation you 
were not doing so. Your perspective on the situation would not, in that sit-
uation, distinguish how things were from how they are now. Now we 
might say that how you are in that situation is a matter of having a sense 
experience which is not a case of perception. And surely it is at least cases 
like these which we have in mind when we think about examples of senso-
ry experience which are not cases of veridical perception. We have a broad-
er conception of sense experience than this, of course. For we allow that we 
can have illusions and hallucinations which are not veridical perceptions 
but which are not indiscriminable from perceptions: their character may 
vary wildly from what the corresponding perception would be like. But for 
the sake of this paper, I want to work with the simplifying assumption that 
throughout we are to deal with what we might call perfect hallucinations.
And for the case of perfect hallucinations, one could get someone to track 
the relevant cases in just the way suggested here.14 
It is this idea, I suggest, that disjunctivists such as Hinton use in order 
to explicate their preferred notion of sense experience in general, i.e. that 
which generalises across veridical perception, illusion and hallucination. 
For in using this Cartesian methodology, one can introduce, at least as a 
first approximation, the range of cases in dispute among the parties, with-
out yet having to admit that there is something of the sort common be-
tween perception, illusion and hallucination of the sort that Hinton wishes 
to dispute. And hence this gives us the second commitment of disjunctiv-
ism:
(II) The notion of a visual experience of a white picket fence is that of a sit-
uation being indiscriminable through reflection from a veridical visual per-
ception of a white picket fence as what it is
We should immediately note three points about (II). First, the acceptabili-
ty of (II) turns on how we are to understand the notion of indiscriminabil-
ity here. And the relevant conception of what it is for one thing to be 
indiscriminable from another is that of not possibly knowing it to be dis-
tinct from the other.15 To be somewhat more precise, since here we are 
concerned with knowing of individual experiences whether they are 
among the veridical perceptions or not, we can gloss it as:
14. For a (too brief) discussion of how we can generalize away from the case of perfect hallucination to 
cover illusions and hallucinations more generally see. (Martin 2004)10
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(That is, x is such that it is not possible to know through reflection that it is 
not one of the veridical perceptions of a white picket fence as what it is)16
This condition is met whenever x is one of the Vs, but if there are truths 
which are unknowable through reflection, then the condition can be met 
in other ways. It should be stressed that it is no part of this discussion that 
we can analyse or reduce the truths concerning indiscriminability, modal 
facts concerning the possibility or impossibility of certain knowledge, to 
claims about the sorting behaviour of individuals, or the functional 
organisation which might underpin such behaviour. As we shall see below 
there are delicate questions for the disjunctivist concerning the link 
between a subject’s failure to treat differently two situations and the claim 
that the two are indiscriminable for that subject.
Second, the restriction ‘through reflection’ is an important and central 
addition here. When we describe the original Cartesian thought experi-
ment, we are considering a case in which we unknowingly find ourselves in 
a situation which we can’t know is not one of staring at a white picket 
fence. But we equally have a conception of sense experiences occurring 
where one has been tipped off about their non-perceptual status. If I take 
you into the bowels of William James Hall and subject you to an expensive 
visual-cortical stimulator so as to induce in you the hallucination of an or-
ange, it seems quite conceivable that I should put you in a situation which 
in a certain respect is just like seeing an orange. In one important respect it 
is not: I have told you the experiment you will be subject to. Since you have 
that information from my testimony, there is something you know which 
rules out your situation from being one in which you see the orange. Since 
we don’t want to deny the possibility that this is a case of perfect hallucina-
tion, we need to bracket the relevance of the additional information you 
have acquired through testimony. This is what the appeal to ‘through re-
15. This approach to indiscriminability is developed in greatest detail in. (Williamson 1990) William-
son principally focuses on the case of knowledge or lack of knowledge of identities and distinctness , 
that x = y or x ≠ y. As I note in the text, we are concerned with the plural form of whether x is one of the 
Vs. This form even more obviously than the case of individual identities and distinctness raises ques-
tions about intensional versus extensional formulations.
16. Jim Pryor and others have suggested to me that in our normal usage of ‘phenomenally indiscrim-
inable’ this phrase should not be interpreted according to the above schema. The schema is not sym-
metrical that hallucinating is not discriminable through reflection from perceiving does not entail that 
perceiving is indiscriminable from hallucinating (cf. (Williamson 2000) ch. 6 and (Williams 1978) 
appendix). But, the complaint goes, it is just obvious that as we use talk of ‘phenomenally indiscrim-
inable’, this relation is symmetrical.
In response, I would suggest that we should be more respectful of the etymology of the term 
which would support the more complex form suggested in the text. That this should lead to a symmet-
rical relation in the case of phenomenal states is readily explicable without supposing it analytic of the 
notion. For the vast majority of philosophers in this debate do make further substantive assumptions 
about the nature of psychological states which would allow experiential states to be indiscriminable in 
our sense only if they are identical in phenomenal character. And it is just these substantive assump-
tions that the disjunctivist challenges.11
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ing an hallucination of an orange is like a Cartesian situation in which you 
don’t know of the hallucination, because, if we bracket that additional in-
formation, then what is available to you otherwise, i.e. what is available to 
you in simply reflecting on your circumstances, does not discriminate be-
tween the two situations. As we shall see in Part Two, the import of this re-
striction and the consequences which flow from it are central to 
understanding what disjunctivism is committed to, and how one should 
characterise one’s objections to that picture of experience.
Third, we should note that condition (II) just taken by itself ought to be 
interpretable as at least extensionally adequate on all theories of perceptual 
experience. Of course, the disjunctivist’s opponent will not think that this 
properly gives an account of the nature of sense experience, and nor, for 
the matter, may it really articulate the concept or conception that we all 
have of what sense experience is. Nonetheless, the condition cannot fail to 
count as a sense experience anything which genuinely is one. For according 
to someone who accepts the Common Kind Assumption, the relevant con-
dition for being an experience, being a P-event we might say,17 will be ex-
emplified by both perceptions and perfect hallucinations. In both cases, 
then, the x in question will be one of the Vs, namely a P-event, and so it 
will not be possible for one to know that it is not one.18 The only way in 
which the extensions of our concept of sense experience and what is de-
fined by (II) may fail to coincide is if (II) really is too liberal: that is, if it 
will include as instances of experience episodes which fail to be P-events. 
Now, as we will see below, the full import of this possibility is a delicate 
matter. But at first sight, this is not a possibility that a theorist will wish to 
countenance. For after all, if in meeting (II) we describe a situation which 
from the subject’s own perspective is just as if one is seeing the white picket 
fence (as the Cartesian thought experiment suggests), then how could it 
fail to count as a visual experience of a white picket fence? For example, if 
the preferred account of experience is one in terms of sense-data, then this 
fact is not one entirely evident to us through initial reflection on our expe-
rience. As both intentional theorists of perception and naïve realists insist, 
at least some objects of awareness are presented as the mind-independent 
objects of perception. Of course the disjunctivist is moved to go further in 
this and claim that it seems to us as if we have a non-representational rela-
tion to the mind-independent objects of awareness. So, a description of 
how our experience is drawing solely on the need to get its introspective 
17. That is, an event of being aware of an array of sense-data with such and such characteristics; or 
being in a state of mind with such and such representational properties or content.
18. Note also that, as formulated, (II) takes no stance on whether perceptions ever occur, or whether a 
subject need believe themselves ever to have perceived anything. All that it requires is that we accept 
that sense experiences have the character at least of seeming to be perceptions.12
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and this the same for veridical perception and for illusion or hallucination 
(in as much as these cannot be told apart from veridical perception). 
Therefore there could be nothing that a non-veridical perception P-event 
would seem to possess to the subject which a non-P-event which was still 
indiscriminable from a veridical perception would thereby lack. Given this, 
someone who wishes to rule out such a case because it is not a P-event 
(whatever the particular account of experience is in question) seems to be 
offering us too restrictive an account of sense experience; for they seem to 
be interpreting what should at best be a sufficient condition for having a 
sense experience as a necessary condition. The catholicism of (II) in this 
case would suggest not that the account is too liberal in conditions on what 
is to count as experience, but rather that the theory in question (be it a 
sense-datum account, or some form of intentionalism) is just too restric-
tive in what it countenances as possible ways in which the kinds of sensory 
experience we have can be realised.
This suggests that the defender of the Common Kind Assumption 
should agree that there can be no case of one of us being in a situation in-
discriminable through reflection from veridical perception which is not a 
case of sense experience, whatever exactly the substantive account of sense 
experience the theorist thereby favours. The consequence of this is to ac-
cept certain constraints on the nature of sense experience and our knowl-
edge of it. It is common for philosophers to suppose that conscious states 
must be (at least to self-conscious beings) self-intimating; such states will 
indicate their presence and some of their properties to the subject who is 
in them. What is required here is much more: that there should be no cir-
cumstance in which we are awake and there be no possibility for us to de-
tect the absence of such states. As we shall see in Part Two, this extra 
epistemological condition bears on the conception one has of introspective 
awareness of sense experience; read in the way that the Common Kind the-
orist requires, it is liable to introduce the need for perfect mechanisms of 
detection.
The disjunctivist’s opponent need not reject (II) itself, or think of it as 
obviously implausible. They may even agree that our initial understanding 
of what sense experience is is as (II) dictates, but then offer a more sub-
stantive account of what it takes for something to be an experience and so 
meet the condition in (II). On the other hand, they may think that the 
condition laid down in (II) itself is too thin, or modest, as an account of 
our understanding of sense experience. Still, for the reasons we have re-
hearsed above, they are unlikely to complain that (II) gets the extension of 
our concept of sense experience wrong. So (II) itself is unlikely to lead to 
any counter-intuitive consequences and on its own can hardly be consid-
ered a particularly controversial commitment of the disjunctivist. The 13
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to thinking that there are some sense experiences which have a distinctive 
nature lacked by others, while (II) insists that all of these can nonetheless 
be indiscriminable from each other introspectively. Together this suggests 
that the phenomenal characters of two experiences can be different even 
while one of them is indiscriminable from the other. Many have supposed 
that what we mean by the phenomenal character of an experience is just 
that aspect of it which is introspectible, and hence that any two experiences 
which are introspectively indiscriminable must share their phenomenal 
characters, even if they differ in other ways.19
Now while some such complaint may have widespread support in dis-
cussions of phenomenal consciousness, it is not clear whether it should be 
taken as a primitive claim which is somehow obvious, and the rejection of 
which is incredible. After all, we can make at least some sense of the idea 
that distinct individuals, distinct events, and distinct scenes can all be per-
ceptually presented to us and yet be perceptually indiscriminable from 
each other. That is, suppose that the individual experiences we have of the 
various individuals, events and scenes we perceive thereby have as part of 
their phenomenal natures the presentation of those very objects; each of 
these individual experiences will be different from each other through fea-
turing one object or event rather than another. Since distinct objects can 
be indiscriminable perceptually, it is plausible that these perceptions 
should be indiscriminable from each other introspectively. If so, distinct 
experiences will be different in ways which is not necessarily detectible 
through introspective reflection.20 It may be right in the end to dismiss 
such theories of perceptual experience as incorrect. But if there is an inco-
herence here, it is a subtle one, and not so glaringly obvious a contradic-
tion. So this throws doubt on the idea that we should view the principle 
that sameness of phenomenal character is guaranteed by phenomenal in-
discriminability as an evident truth. If we think the conjunction of (I) and 
(II) generates a counter-intuitive position, then there must be some fur-
ther principle at work behind our thoughts which forces us to accept this 
strong condition.
Once one accepts that (I) and (II) are both true, then one must also 
deny that two experiences, one of which is indiscriminable from the other, 
must share phenomenal character (that is, one denies: any phenomenal 
character the one experience has, the other has too). But it is consistent 
with accepting these two principles that one hold that such experiences 
19. In effect, this is to press what I called principle (IND) in (Martin 1997): ‘If two experiences are 
indistinguishable for the subject of them then the two experiences are of the same conscious character’ 
(p.81).
20. I discuss this option for an intentional theory of perception in (Martin 2002). There are delicate 
questions to be raised here about the inter-relation between the phenomenology of individual experi-
ences and the ways in which experiences are similar or different from each other.14
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this would be to suppose that (II) fixes for one a determinable notion of 
phenomenal character, one which is realisable in a number of different 
ways. As (I) specifies, this phenomenal character is realisable in a manner 
specific to veridical perceptions, a manner not shared with illusion or hal-
lucination. The sense-datum theorist and the intentionalist each offer ac-
counts of different ways in which the same determinable can be realised. 
This is consistent with the rejection of the Common Kind Assumption as 
long as the particular manner in which the phenomenal character is real-
ised in the case of veridical perception could not occur in either cases of il-
lusion or hallucination. This model also captures the thought expressed 
above in relation to (II), that we should not suppose that there need be a 
unique way in which a given phenomenal character can be realised, at least 
with respect to illusions or hallucinations.
Although this position would share much with disjunctivism, this does 
not yet capture the key thought behind disjunctivism. To employ this 
model as an expression of disjunctivism would be to adopt an unstable po-
sition. In addition to (I) and (II) disjunctivism requires one to take on a 
further commitment. Put in the most general terms, the model so far 
sketched leaves open both the status of the common phenomenal charac-
ter among perception, illusion and hallucination, and whether this can be 
conceived autonomously of veridical perception, and it leaves open the 
conception of the ways in which that character can be realised. As we shall 
see, the disjunctivist needs to take a stand on both of these things, and the 
resulting account is more radical than anything so far sketched.
3. The easiest way to develop this is to proceed through a particular line of 
reasoning related to the argument from hallucination. But the main moral 
I want to draw is one which can be generalised away from the commit-
ments of this argument. One formulation of the argument from hallucina-
tion focuses on questions about the causal conditions for bringing about 
hallucinations, and in particular works with the thought that it is possible 
that a hallucination can be brought about through the same proximate 
causal conditions as a veridical perception – what I shall call a causally 
matching hallucination.21 In its standard form, this argument relies on 
some principle of ‘Same Cause, Same Effect’. To draw a conclusion from 
the case of veridical perception about that of causally matching hallucina-
tion, the principle requires us to suppose a commonality among all cases 
in which proximate causal conditions are the same. In such a form, the 
21. See for example, (Robinson 1985), (Robinson 1994), (Foster 1986), Ch.II sec. X, (and for a repudi-
ation of his earlier acceptance) (Foster 2000); for critical discussion see (Pitcher 1971)and (Hinton 
1973); cf. also (Merleau-Ponty 1942)and (Valberg 1992).15
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rules out the possibility that relational states of affairs or events can form 
part of the causal nexus where relational state of affairs may differ purely in 
their distal elements.
A modified form of the argument concerns the reverse direction, from 
what must be true of cases of causally matching hallucinations to what is 
must thereby be true of the veridical perceptions they match. A weakened 
form of ‘Same Cause, Same Effect’ that requires similarity of outcomes 
where local causal and non-causal conditions are the same seems to re-
quire that similar effects are present in cases of veridical perception as in 
causally matching hallucination. For since we pick out the cases of halluci-
nation through their lack of the required conditions for veridical percep-
tion, it is unclear that any non-causal condition required for the 
occurrence of a specific hallucination is not thereby also present in the case 
of veridical perception it matches. In this case, therefore, whatever effect 
can be produced in the case of the causally matching hallucination, the 
same effect will have been produced in the case of veridical perception.
Accepting this conclusion is not in itself tantamount to affirming the 
Common Kind Assumption. That demands that whatever is the most spe-
cific kind of experience occurring when one has a veridical perception, the 
same kind of experience can occur when one has an illusion or hallucina-
tion. The most that this argument could show is that whatever is the most 
specific kind of effect produced when having a causally matching halluci-
nation, that same kind of effect occurs when one has a veridical percep-
tion. But that this is the most specific kind of effect that occurs when one 
has an hallucination does not entail that this is the most specific kind of ef-
fect that occurs when one is veridically perceiving. Nonetheless, it does 
raise two pressing questions for the disjunctivist. First, what character can 
the hallucinatory experience possess which could also be possessed by the 
veridical perception without thereby being the most specific kind of men-
tal event that the veridical perception exemplifies? Second, if there is a kind 
common to the veridical perception and its causally matching hallucina-
tion, what shows that what is relevant to the explanations we want to give 
is ever the kind of event peculiar to veridical perception rather than what is 
common to veridical perception and causally matching hallucination?
In answer to these two questions, one can propose the third commit-
ment of disjunctivism:
(III) For certain visual experiences as of a white picket fence, namely caus-
ally matching hallucinations, there is no more to the phenomenal character 
of such experiences than that of being indiscriminable from corresponding 
visual perceptions of a white picket fence as what it is
As we can see from the logic of indiscriminability, no veridical perception 
can be known not to be a veridical perception. So veridical perceptions are 16
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tion.22 In relation to the second question, it is clear that meeting this con-
dition cannot screen off the property of being a veridical perception from 
any explanatory role that the naïve realist supposes that only veridical per-
ception experiences exemplify. At the same time, we can see the answer to 
the first question. As those attracted to disjunctivism in the theory of per-
ception have often been tempted to say, and those attracted to the idea of 
object-dependent thought, in cases where the relevant conditions for such 
a state of mind are absent, then there must be something intrinsically de-
fective or lacking about the state. This is made explicit in the thought that 
while there is a positive specific nature to the veridical perception, there is 
nothing more to the character of the (causally matching) hallucination 
than that it can’t be told apart through reflection from the veridical per-
ception.23
This condition is definitely forced on one if one accepts the reasoning 
above involving a form of the ‘Same Cause, Same Effect’ principle. Al-
though the principle there employed is sufficiently weakened to allow for 
the existence of (partially) externally individuated effects, some may still 
question whether we have any such commitment to causal principles 
which bridge between mental phenomena and their physical antecedents. 
Even in that case, I suggest the disjunctivist should be wary of holding back 
a commitment to (III). Once one allows that there is a more substantive 
characterisation available across a wide range of cases of what it is for mere 
appearance to occur, the question arises whether such a state can also be 
present in the case of veridical perception. The reasons that the naïve real-
ist offers for supposing that a distinctive state is present when so perceiving 
do not readily translate to show that nothing else could also be occurring 
in such circumstances. Yet once one is deprived of grounds for denying the 
presence of some such common element between perception and halluci-
nation, then a threat of explanatory pre-emption of the common feature 
overcomes the claims of that which is peculiar to the case of veridical per-
ception. The reverse causal argument demonstrates the existence of a po-
tential explanatory competitor for the veridical perception and hence 
makes clear the need for a disjunctivist to specify what form of common 
mental kind between perception and hallucination would be consistent 
with disjunctivism. If one rejects the relevant weakened form of ‘Same 
Cause, Same Effect’, then there is no such direct demonstration of the ex-
22. This is to move too quickly. The condition of being indiscriminable from a veridical perception of a 
white picket fence does not necessarily specify a property or kind of event, rather than specifying a 
condition that individual events may meet. One might take the alleged non-transitivity of just notice-
able difference to show that there cannot be kinds of experience defined in this way. For more on this 
see (Martin 2004).
23. There is a longer exposition of both this problem and how (III) offers a solution in (Martin 2004) 
pp 52–70.17
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been offered that there cannot be some such mental kind in common, that 
what some hallucinations exemplify can also be present in veridical per-
ception. The concerns about explanatory exclusion or screening off do not 
derive solely from the ‘Same Cause, Same Effect’ principle, and so cannot 
be ignored simply by rejecting it.
It is instructive to compare and contrast the situation here with the dis-
cussion that Timothy Williamson has launched over the case of knowledge 
and belief. Williamson argues that it is a mistake to think that the state of 
knowledge is decomposable into the presence of belief with further condi-
tions, as the ‘traditional’ approach supposes. But Williamson also argues 
against the idea that we should endorse a disjunctive approach to belief, 
taking belief to be either knowledge or purported knowledge. Instead, Wil-
liamson suggests that knowledge and belief may co-exist (accepting the 
common thought that knowledge entails belief) but play distinct explana-
tory roles.24 Williamson’s strategy in arguing his case for taking knowledge 
as a primitive mental state is precisely to argue for its having a distinctive 
explanatory role which could not be taken by belief. This is quite consist-
ent with the idea that belief has its own explanatory role untouched by that 
of knowledge.
The dialectical position is different in the case of debate about percep-
tion and sensory appearance (contra Williamson). For while there are as-
pects of psychological explanation where one can conceive of a division of 
explanatory spoils between an appeal to perceptual states on the one hand 
(i.e. those not common to perception and hallucination) and an appeal to 
sensory experience as something common across the cases, there is also a 
central area of concern where the two notions are bound to be in competi-
tion. For consider the subject’s stream of consciousness, that temporal ex-
tension of episodes and conscious processes which make up a central core 
of his or her biography. We can avoid the question of explanatory exclu-
sion here if it makes sense to suppose that both perceptual episodes (pecu-
liar only to perception) and sensory experiences (common to perception 
and hallucination) can occupy locations within this stream. Yet such does 
not seem to be the case: if we are intending to give the most determinate 
and specific account of how things are with a subject at a given time, there-
by picking out their conscious state, either what we pick out is the percep-
tual episode, as the naïve realist supposes, or the common sensory 
experience, as defenders of the Common Kind Assumption suppose. So al-
lowing for explanatory independence of notions of perception and experi-
ence in other realms of the psychological would not settle this question 
where competition cannot be avoided.
24. See, (Williamson 1995) pp 558–563 and, (Williamson 2000) pp 41–48.18
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knowledge. It is questionable whether either phenomenon actually belongs 
within the stream of consciousness (in part that turns on the relation one 
hypothesises between active judgement and belief or knowledge). And, 
however one settles that question, we have a handle on the explanatory 
role of these notions within psychology independent of questions about 
phenomenal consciousness. While we do have a conception of how per-
ceptual states may explain things about a subject beyond an immediate 
concern with phenomenal consciousness – for example explaining how 
they are in a position to have some of the beliefs they have and to act as 
they do – the presence of such an explanatory role is already common 
ground before the debate about perception arises. So the focus of dispute 
really is over the status of the experiential episode present in conscious 
perceiving, and all parties are committed to supposing that there are com-
peting accounts to be given of this. So extending the Williamson strategy 
into the debate about sensory experience is of no avail.
Hence, we can see that the way of combining (I) and (II) suggested ear-
lier is not really available for the disjunctivist. If we suppose that (II) fixes 
for us a determinable notion of phenomenal character which has a variety 
of determinations, then we must suppose that it has some characterisation 
as a determinable independently of any of its determinations (as we have a 
conception of red independent of knowledge of what it is to be scarlet or 
vermillion). (II) itself does not give us any such specification, since it fixes 
the range of cases relative to the case of veridical perception, one of the 
supposed determinations. Moreover, the case of causally matching halluci-
nation gives us an example of an experience which satisfies (II) but fails to 
give us a determination of phenomenal character more specific than this 
determinable. In general we suppose that determinables to be instantiated 
require that some specific determination or other is realised. On the other 
hand, if we seek to remove these disanalogies and posit an appropriate de-
termination for the case of causally matching hallucination, or seek some 
characterisation of phenomenal character in substantive terms independ-
ent of veridical perception, then we are faced with the problems of explan-
atory exclusion or screening off. The disjunctivist consistently can hold on 
to veridical perception as a special case only through denying that the no-
tion of sensory experience, and any specification of it which can occur in 
the case of causally matching hallucination have any explanatory role au-
tonomous of that of veridical perception itself.
Another way to put this point is to highlight that there are two sides to 
the disjunctivist’s original conception of perception and sensory appear-
ances. On the one hand is the thought that there is something special 
about the ‘good’ case, the presence of veridical perception and the appre-
hension of the mind-independent world. What holds essentially of the 19
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sion and hallucination, so we can hold to the intuition that such states in 
themselves relate us to the mind-independent world. On the other hand, 
though, is the thought that in the ‘bad’ cases, the cases of illusion and hal-
lucination, one is in a situation which fails to be the way that good cases 
are, but which purports to be the way that the good case is. Were a positive 
characterisation always possible of the bad cases independent of their rela-
tion to veridical perception, were the notion of perceptual experience con-
struable independent of this relation, then that these cases were bad would 
not be something intrinsic to them. This would not be a matter of us 
seemingly being related to the world but failing to be so, but rather being a 
certain way which we might also confuse with being perceptually related. 
So the disjunctivist thinks that there are cases of phenomenal conscious-
ness which are essentially failures – they purport to relate us to the world 
while failing to do so. Commitment (III) makes this additional element 
clear in a way that (I) and (II) alone cannot do.
Part Two
4. I’ve argued that a disjunctivist had better endorse (III), if he or she wish-
es to be consistent in their position and respect the other commitments 
which lead one to adopt disjunctivism in the first place. But is one left with 
a coherent position in accepting (III)? The disjunctivist claims that sense 
experience in the case of causally matching hallucination is nothing more 
than the obtaining of certain negative epistemological conditions and what 
follows from them: that it is not possible to know through reflection that 
this is not a situation of veridical perception. But this seems to suggest that 
there is nothing positive to the character of the experience in itself. Could 
having a sense experience be nothing more than this?
Complete incredulity at this thought is voiced by A.D. Smith when he 
complains:
To say simply that our subject is not aware of anything is surely to under-
describe this situation dramatically. Perhaps we can make sense of there be-
ing ‘mock thoughts’, but can there really be such a thing as mock sensory 
awareness? Perhaps there can be ‘an illusion of understanding’, but can there 
be an illusion of awareness?... The sensory features of the situation need to 
be accounted for… If we take as our example subjects who are fully attentive 
and focused, we need to do justice to the fact that such subjects in some 
sense take cognizance of, indeed fully attend to, sensory presentations. But 
if so, what else can we say other than that the subject is, as the Argument re-
quires, aware of a non-normal object?
…What, however, is it for someone to seem to confront something? Unless 
more is said, we are left without any means of distinguishing the hallucina-20
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notic suggestion, gross mental confusion, inattentiveness, jumping the gun 
and so on. ((Smith 2002), pp. 224-5.)25
In fact, Smith’s intended target here is broader than the disjunctivism we 
have here been discussing. Smith is concerned to reject any view according 
to which a particular object is sensorily presented in veridical perception, 
while no corresponding object is presented when one has the matching 
hallucination. One could hold such a doctrine and yet insist that there is 
something appropriately common across the two cases – that there is, for 
example, a common representational content which in the one context se-
cures an object, but in the other fails to.26 On such a view, there is some-
thing common between a case of perception and hallucination which 
makes both a sensory occurrence; and it is by reference to this common el-
ement that one can contrast a genuinely experiential situation with any oc-
casion in which there is nothing sensory occurring at all, that is that there 
is common representational sensory feature. If Smith insists that that is not 
what is required (if he insists that what one needs is a common object of at-
tention), then the complaint swiftly becomes an expression of the convic-
tion that sense-datum theorists have, that things cannot be sensorily so 
unless there really is something thus and so for one to be sensing. That is 
hardly an intuition that many now share. Rather, those who endorse the 
Common Kind Assumption may well agree that there has to be something
in common between perception and hallucination, that there must be a 
common way of sensing between the two which requires a unified account. 
What they will deny is that what is common need be thought of as any 
kind of object of awareness, rather than the sensory basis of attention to 
the environment.
Therefore, Smith’s complaint seems best targeted at the disjunctivist 
position we have elaborated above. For affirming (III) does seem to lead to 
the kind of position that Smith finds incredible. Smith emphasises the dis-
tinction between sensory and mere cognitive aspects of the mind. The 
specification of a situation as one in which it is not possible to know that it 
is not perception seems, like the condition ‘seems to confront’ which 
Smith discusses, a cognitive and not a sensory condition. In contrast to the 
representationalist just discussed, the disjunctivist does deny him or her-
self the resource of some positive element of the situation, an element 
25. Compare also Valberg’s criticisms of Anscombe on the intentionality of sensation in (Valberg 
1992).
26. One might consider the approach developed by Tyler Burge in a number of papers (in particular, 
(Burge 1977), (Burge 1983) and (Burge 1993)) as offering such accounts. I discuss such possibilities for 
an intentional approach to perception in (Martin 2002).  Note, in addition, that though Smith takes 
Evans as a target of his discussion, Evans’s own view of perceptual experience is not disjunctivist. The 
brief account Evans gives in ch. 5 of (Evans 1982) develops an account of information states on which 
it is possible for an information state to exist while lacking a proper object.21
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contrast to the cases of mere intellectual disorder.
While the focus of Smith’s complaint is basically an assertion of the in-
adequacy of the view he opposes, he does, in addition add towards the end 
of the passage a briefly sketched argument through which I think we can 
articulate more the kind of resistance that Smith offers. Smith notes that 
there are cases which no one would think involve sensory experience of the 
relevant sort: cases of post-hypnotic suggestion or inattention. Our intui-
tions for such cases are that while a subject may possess some of the cogni-
tive concomitants of sense experience, the relevant sensory state is lacking: 
at best the subject matches a normal subject only with respect to the cogni-
tive consequences of sense experience, not in sense experience itself. If 
causally matching hallucination is assimilated to these cases, then it would 
seem, as Smith complains, that the possibility of hallucination is really be-
ing denied by the disjunctivist, rather than being accommodated through 
appeals to (II) and (III). For surely, the complaint continues, our basic 
commitment is that (at least some) hallucinations are examples of genuine 
sense experience even if they fail to be cases of veridical perception. We 
suppose that there is something defective in the subject’s relation to the ex-
ternal world perceived; and not that there is merely a defect in how they re-
late to their own states of mind. 
Smith is owed an account by the disjunctivist of how we are to distin-
guish cases which intuitively do not involve a visual sense experience of a 
white picket fence, such as when one is under the post-hypnotic suggestion 
that that is what one can see, from cases in which one does have such an 
experience but does so only through meeting the condition in (III). But, as 
we shall see below, there is in fact much that the disjunctivist can and 
would say to contrast the two kinds of case. Yet even if an answer can be 
given to this, Smith may complain that it doesn’t locate the difference in 
the right place. For Smith has in mind what the most satisfying account of 
the difference should amount to, and that kind of account the disjunctivist 
cannot offer. It is tempting to say of someone under the influence of post-
hypnotic suggestion that they simply lack a mental state with the relevant 
phenomenal characteristics, whatever cognitive states they also possess in 
this situation. So the only difference that really matters between the subject 
of a causally matching hallucination and a post-hypnotic suggestion vic-
tim is the presence in the former case (and absence in the latter) of these 
phenomenal characteristics. If the disjunctivist can point to a difference 
between the two kinds of case which is consistent with (III), then that will 
relate to the kinds of condition mentioned in (II) and (III), namely the 
sense in which the one situation is or is not knowably distinct from veridi-
cal perception. But such a condition seems itself to be cognitive, since it 
talks of what one can or cannot know. At the same time, affirming (III) 22
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be present in the case of the causally matching hallucination. Hence, the 
disjunctivist would seem to deny the intuition that the difference here 
must be one of the presence or absence of the phenomenal state of mind. 
And it is this thought which makes Smith, or someone moved by his com-
plaints, suppose that the disjunctivist cannot be giving an account of sense 
experience at all.
Now a swift riposte to this would be to point out that the disjunctivist 
requires that a perfect hallucination be one which is indiscriminable from 
a veridical perception. What more could be required of how the subject is 
than that this condition is met? Surely the condition of introspective indis-
criminability guarantees that phenomenal consciousness is present. So the 
disjunctivist is not assimilating the hallucinating subject to the victim of 
post-hypnotic suggestion. Although I think it is right for the disjunctivist 
to resist Smith’ characterisation; as it stands, this response is too swift to be 
adequate. Compare the concern here with the more familiar discussions of 
absent qualia and philosophical zombies in relation to functionalism and 
the conceivability argument for dualism. When a critic complains against a 
functionalist account of the mind that it is quite conceivable that a creature 
should satisfy all of the functional conditions for mentality and yet lack 
phenomenal consciousness, the complaint made is one external to the 
terms of the functionalist theory. The critic claims that we can both imag-
ine that some creature satisfies the functionalist definition and yet lacks 
phenomenal consciousness as we commonly conceive it. To this the func-
tionalist may respond that, by his or her lights, if the functionalist condi-
tions really are met for mentality, then there is no possibility of the absence 
of phenomenal consciousness. What the critic puts forward either is not 
really possible, or has been misdescribed. 
Whether the argumentative position of the initial complaint against 
functionalism, or the robust response to it begs the question given debate 
in the area is a delicate question. Matters seem more straightforward in the 
current case, though. For when we turn to our more limited troubles about 
sensory experience, the challenge seems rather to be internal to the dis-
junctivist’s concerns. While it is true that disjunctivism need not attempt 
to offer a general account of sentience as such, the disjunctivist clearly does 
suppose that sensory experience in certain cases amounts to more than the 
meeting of the negative epistemological conditions. For the disjunctivist 
does not suppose that veridical perception as such should simply be a mat-
ter of meeting certain epistemological conditions. Given a commitment to 
naïve realism, the disjunctivist claims that veridical perception involves 
standing in some relation of awareness to the various objects of awareness. 
This additional condition is not present in the case of causally matching 
hallucination. So, it appears as if, by the disjunctivist’s own lights, there is a 23
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phenomenal experience, which positive element is lacking in the case of 
causally matching hallucination, though unknowably so. It is this aspect of 
what the disjunctivist him or herself says which seems to justify the charac-
terisation of the position above, which lies at the basis of Smith’s com-
plaint. Treating the disjunctivist’s account of causally matching 
hallucination as a case of absent qualia, therefore, seems to be to offer an 
internal critique of disjunctivism.
The swift response to this challenge is simply to claim that the objection 
misses that since the hallucination is indiscriminable from veridical per-
ception phenomenal consciousness must be present. But that misses the 
burdens of argument. The disjunctivist who responds this way leaves un-
touched the worry about the coherence of his or her position: whether 
commitment (III) is really consistent with this alleged entailment. For, of 
course, it is not that Smith thinks it actually possible (or even coherent to 
suppose) that one should be in the same cognitive position as a subject 
who possesses phenomenal consciousness and yet lack such consciousness. 
Indeed, Smith’s complaint seems rather to be that when we focus on the 
kind of experience we all enjoy, when we exploit our own self-awareness of 
that experience, we can see that it is impossible for someone to be this kind 
of way (the way required equally for genuine hallucination as for percep-
tion) and yet lack any positive phenomenal character. So Smith, too, would 
agree with the disjunctivist that if the situation really is one of being indis-
criminable through reflection from a veridical perception, then matters 
will be phenomenologically just as in the case of veridical perception. But 
this is precisely because, in addition to the facts that the disjunctivist ap-
peals to, some positive phenomenal characteristics must also be present, 
guaranteeing that this is a genuinely sensory occurrence. This is to contra-
dict the claim in (III) that there is no further positive characterisation to be 
given of the situation than that which follows from the negative epistemo-
logical properties.
The debate here is then not over whether both sides should agree that 
the subject genuinely has sense experience in the case of causally matching 
hallucination, in contrast to the case of post-hypnotic suggestion. Both 
sides should agree with that. The question is whether the disjunctivist can 
show that one can coherently claim this while also affirming (III). Appeal-
ing to (II) or (III) alone does not show this. Rather, if Smith’s complaint 
mischaracterises the situation by the disjunctivist’s lights, then there must 
be some mistake in the reasoning which has got us to this point. There 
must have been something wrong in the thought that the disjunctivist is 
simply appealing to cognitive and not sensory features of the situation 
when the causally matching hallucination is taken to fulfil the condition 
specified in (III). But how can that condition indicate anything about the 24
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some positive feature which either will or will not be common with the 
case of veridical perception?
We need to identify which elements in Smith’s line of thought about the 
situation the disjunctivist will have to reject. Now, the characterisation that 
we extracted from Smith of the causally matching hallucination is forced 
upon us, I suggest, if we accept a certain picture of the relation between 
phenomenal consciousness on the one hand, and self-awareness of our 
cognitive states of response to phenomenal consciousness on the other. 
That is, one may conceive that the facts about phenomenal consciousness 
are fixed independently of whether a subject has any perspective on his or 
her own conscious states and is thereby self-aware of them. In general, 
then, it should be possible for us to settle whether someone is phenome-
nally conscious or not without having to make any appeal to the subject’s 
own higher-order perspective on these conscious states. In turn, that sug-
gests that adopting the higher-order perspective on one’s phenomenal 
consciousness, coming to be self-aware and attentive of it, is thereby to put 
oneself in a position to acquire knowledge of something independent of 
this perspective itself. In coming to make judgements about how things 
phenomenally appear to one, one makes judgements about a subject-mat-
ter that obtains independently of one’s being in a position to make those 
judgements.
At the same time, we are inclined to view this higher-order perspective 
as one of self-awareness and self-consciousness. It is not clear that we can 
quite conceive of the cognitive aspect of such a state of mind as other than 
awareness of one’s mind, and hence a form of, or ground for, knowledge. 
In which case, one could not be this way cognitively (i.e. with this range of 
judgements, formed in this way) without being self-aware and self-know-
ing: phenomenal conscious would have to be present. On this picture, al-
though the facts about phenomenal consciousness obtain independently 
and prior to any facts about our knowledge of it, our introspective cogni-
tion of phenomenal consciousness need not be independent of that con-
sciousness: seeming awareness of one’s conscious mind will always be 
genuine self-awareness.27
Now, in this context, it is plausible to argue that the negative epistemo-
logical properties the disjunctivist appeals to belong at the level of higher-
order awareness or self-knowledge, rather than at the level of phenomenal 
consciousness itself. In that case, the presence or absence of the negative 
epistemological property will not determine the presence or absence of 
phenomenal consciousness, but will rather simply fix whether or not the 
subject is aware of these facts, and hence is self-aware or self-conscious. In 
27. This is an intuition to which we will return below.25
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disjunctivist fix only facts on the cognitive side of the divide. Where the 
disjunctivist claims to be characterising sense experience without aware-
ness of the environment, the complaint here is that they can only be de-
scribing the absence of experience with necessary ignorance of this fact. 
Although the claim is localised just to the case of causally matching hallu-
cination, still the disjunctivist seems to be describing to us the case of ab-
sent qualia, or the philosophical zombie, the alleged possibility of which 
have plagued functionalist theories of the mind and various forms of phys-
icalism. Since it is commonly taken to show that a theory is inadequate as 
an account of phenomenal consciousness if it could equally be true of a 
philosophical zombie, it would seem to be a failing in the disjunctivist ac-
count if it ends up claiming that in cases of hallucination we are no better 
off than such mythical beings.
If the disjunctivist is to resist Smith’s characterisation of the situation, 
the disjunctivist must, at the very least, reject this picture of the relation 
between phenomenal consciousness and our awareness of it. What alterna-
tive is there? I shall suggest that the disjunctivist needs to stress the connec-
tion between phenomenal consciousness and having a point of view or 
perspective on the world. The negative epistemological condition when 
correctly interpreted will specify not a subject’s cognitive response to their 
circumstances – and hence their knowledge or ignorance of how things are 
with them – but rather their perspective on the world. This is sufficient for 
it to be true of a subject that there is something it is like for them to be so. 
In that way we can say of the subject of causally matching hallucination 
that they must indeed possess phenomenal consciousness precisely be-
cause, in meeting the relevant condition for the negative epistemological 
property, they thereby possess a point of view on the world, in this case not 
extending beyond how things are with them at that moment, since ex hy-
pothesi perfect hallucination does not provide one with any awareness of 
the environment. So the subject, in this case, would possess subjectivity 
and thereby be conscious since there is something it is like for them to be 
so. Appeal to further facts over and above those which provide for their 
subjectivity and for there to be something it is like for them to be so would 
thereby be redundant.
In developing the alternative account here, we need first to start with a 
seemingly more limited problem with the disjunctivist’s appeal to (II) and 
(III). For as these claims pick out sense experiences which are not veridical 
perceptions by reference to introspective reflection. So it is natural to ask: 
How the disjunctivist’s account can be extended to account for the sense 
experience of creatures which lack self-consciousness, self-awareness or 
any introspective capacity at all? We can give a satisfactory answer to this 
question only after rehearsing some familiar considerations for contrasting 26
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done that, we will see that the restriction ‘through introspective reflection’ 
must work rather differently from how the model sketched above suppos-
es. In turn this will lay bare for us what the deeper disagreement really 
amounts to.
5. Suppose that dogs are sentient but lack any interesting theory of mind. 
In particular let us suppose that they lack the cognitive sophistication to 
entertain thoughts about their own experiences and the similarities and 
differences among them. Note that this is not to deny them thoughts about 
the objects of perception and the similarities and differences among them. 
The disjunctive theory can make sense of the thought that a dog’s visual 
perception of a bunch of carrots is different in character from the dog’s ol-
factory apprehension of a bowl of meaty chunks. The first experience, after 
all, may have among its constituents visually manifest objects and qualities 
such as carrots, the orange of their flesh and the green of the leaves; while 
the latter experience involves the smelly presence of jelly and wet cooked 
meat. So far this fits with our intuitions that the world can be a relatively 
varied place for the dog, even if it lacks the sophistication to think about 
the world in as many rich ways as we can.
If we move from the case of perception alone to ask how the disjunctiv-
ist is to think of dog sensory experience including illusion and hallucina-
tion, then the answer is presumably to be supplied by (II): that the dog’s 
experiences should be the same or different to the extent that they are dis-
criminable or indiscriminable through introspective reflection. Yet if we 
are asking of the dog’s own knowledge of the sameness or difference of his 
or her experiences, then we already have the answer that the dog does not 
know of the distinctness of any of their experiences. For the dog lacks all 
knowledge that any given experience is of this or that kind, lacking the 
conceptual resources to make any such judgement. From this it seems to 
follow that by (II) each experience the dog has is of the same kind as any 
other experience that the dog has. Thought of one way, one might then 
suppose that the dog simply has just one kind of experience. But given that 
we can make sense by the disjunctivist’s lights of the various perceptions 
that the dog has, one may equally argue that each experience would have to 
exemplify every possible kind of experience that the dog could enjoy. Each 
experience would exemplify all, and indeed contradictory, phenomenal 
characteristics at once. Either way, we seem to be landed with an absurd 
picture.
How can the disjunctivist avoid this unfortunate conclusion? We arrive 
at the conclusion if we suppose that (II) is talking about the knowledge 27
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ence of psychological states. Is there any other way of reading (II)?
The first move to make in response is to consider a slightly less aggra-
vated version of the problem. (II) read in one way will generate problems 
for us even if we stick to self-aware human beings. Imagine the case of John 
who has normal sensory sensitivity but is very much in a world of his own 
and inattentive to things he sees or tastes. Let’s suppose that John doesn’t 
do well at telling scarlet from vermillion. Just as he is bad at telling apart 
samples of these shades of red, so we may suppose him inattentive at tell-
ing apart the visual experiences of these samples. In such cases it seems 
perfectly appropriate to say not only that John doesn’t discriminate the 
samples or experiences, but also that he can’t. But this seems to commit us 
to saying that the experience of scarlet and the experience of vermillion are 
indiscriminable for John, and hence by (II) that the experiences should be 
the same. Yet it was no part of our initial commitment that the experiences 
should have to be the same: we were making an observation about John’s 
inclination to attend and the judgements he is liable to make; nothing need 
be included in this about how he will or will not experience the world to 
be.28
In response to this worry, we should note that there are different ways 
we can be talking about someone’s inability or incapacity to do something. 
Often when we note not only that someone has not done something but 
that they could not have done it, that they lack the ability or the capacity, 
then we indicate that there is some particular ground present which is op-
erative in their failure. When Nancy stumbles on the dance floor, one 
might say not only that she is failing to dance the tango but that she simply 
can’t dance it. In saying on this occasion that she can’t dance it, one might 
not mean that there are no circumstances in which she succeeds in dancing 
the tango, or even that normally she is able to. Perhaps Nancy is a dance in-
structor, and the tango is her speciality; however, this evening given how 
much she has had to drink, there is just no way that her limbs can coordi-
nate successfully to produce a tango.
When we talk about particular individuals’ incapacities or inabilities, 
therefore, we often have in mind some specific condition obtaining in 
them in virtue of which the failure is bound to be present. That one person 
could not do something on a particular occasion, does not mean that they 
couldn’t do it on some other occasion, or that others cannot, or that a dif-
ferent range of people could not do that thing. We can, therefore, by suita-
ble shift of context get claims about someone’s inability to come out true 
28. Note that this is not to prejudge the question how the presence of phenomenal consciousness and 
the possibility of attending to a phenomenon fit together – for example, I take no stance here on the 
proper interpretation of inattentional blindness (see) (Mack and Rock 1998) or change blindness (see, 
among other things (McConkie 1979) and(Dennett 1991)).28
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or preventing them from exercising it.
However, sometimes we have ways of talking which aspire, as one 
might say, to greater impartiality. For example, if you take a suit to the tai-
lor’s for invisible mending, the tailor will not have lived up to his or her ad-
vertisements if they mend the clothes with thick, bright red thread but 
then pluck your eyes out. If clothes genuinely have had invisible mending, 
then the mend should not just not be visible to you, but must not be visible 
to anyone. Moreover, in saying that it should not be visible to anyone, one 
may well intend no restriction on this at all: it is not just not visible to the 
average English person who has learnt not to pay too close attention to 
others’ attire, it is also not visible to Italians, or Americans, more used to 
admiring the fine textiles with which the human form can be clothed. 
Pushed to the limit, then, we seem to have an appeal to an impersonal talk 
of inability or incapacity: we are talking about what sight can discern for 
you, or of some aspect of the object in question, rather than some way a 
given individual or group of individuals is such that they can’t succeed in a 
particular task.
Here, too, there can be different ranges of possibility we have in mind. 
The difference between two objects may be invisible given the normal 
spectrum of light that we are sensitive to. Perhaps there is a surface blemish 
of one which turns up only when one is sensitive to infrared or ultraviolet 
light. In asking about what vision can reveal to us, we can ask in terms of 
how vision actually is, or ways in which vision could be. In turn, the most 
extreme claim of incapacity to tell apart here would concern the impossi-
bility of knowing through any way that vision could be of the obtaining of 
a certain fact.
Applying this to the case of introspective reflection and the case of 
John, we can see that in that case any appropriate claim of indiscriminabil-
ity turned on incapacities specific to John – his inattention or carelessness 
– grounds which prevent John in particular from exercising the relevant 
discrimination. But when we are comparing experiences as relevantly alike 
or not, we are not concerned with whether John himself is particularly at-
tentive to the subtle variations in colour appearance, or whether he has a 
good visual memory, rather we are interested in whether with respect to 
the mode of introspective reflection the situations can be discriminated or 
not. So we are interested in the impersonal notion of inability or incapacity 
here. That is we are interested in the claim that John is in a situation for 
which it is impossible simpliciter and not just impossible for John to tell 
apart through introspective reflection from a veridical perception of a 
patch of scarlet. In this case, the experience of a swatch of vermilion will 
not count as indiscriminable from this perception because although John 
himself might fail to notice the difference, there is a difference between the 29
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notice. And, the disjunctivist wishes to claim, it is our understanding of 
this fact which grounds our recognition that John’s experiences can differ 
from each other. Although attention typically does lead to differences in 
sense experience – and according to some empirical hypotheses makes for 
all the difference between presence of phenomenal consciousness and its 
absence – we do have the conception that it is possible for experience to be 
a certain way whether focally attended to or not. And in this particular in-
stance, we find quite conceivable that there was a way things were for John 
had he but directed his attention. In appealing to the impersonal sense of 
indiscriminability the disjunctivist can make sense of this conception.
Earlier we noted that Smith presented a challenge for the disjunctivist: 
for the account to be adequate it needs to make sense of the intuitive con-
trast between a victim of hypnotic suggestion, or mental confusion, and 
someone genuinely having an hallucination. We can now see how the dis-
junctivist will answer this challenge. In such cases, while there may be 
grounds for the particular individual why he or she will fail to know of the 
difference between the situation that he or she is in, and the visual percep-
tion of a white picket fence, it won’t follow from this alone that his or her 
situation is objectively, or impersonally, indiscriminable from a veridical 
perception. We intuitively track the difference in contrasting how we imag-
ine things to be presented to them, or how we conceive it as not being pre-
sented, with the individual’s failure to appreciate that difference. The 
contrast between a case in which the subject fails to distinguish their situa-
tion from one of perceiving the picket fence and one in which their situa-
tion is such that it is impersonally indiscriminable from one of perceiving 
makes space for just this contrast. However, as we already remarked, to 
highlight the difference in these terms is not to answer the challenge in the 
way that Smith supposes the intuitive one. According to him, the only 
plausible answer is to say that the difference between the two kinds of case 
turns simply on the presence or absence of phenomenal consciousness, in-
dependent of any facts about what is or is not knowably different about the 
cases. But that is to raise again the more fundamental disagreement to 
which we shall return later.
In summary, while some talk of the impossibility of acting or sensing in 
a certain way focuses on the specific limitations that an agent or group of 
agents may possess, we also have ways of talking of the impossibility of do-
ing, sensing or knowing which is not grounded in the specific capacities or 
incapacities of agents. It is with reference to this notion that the disjunctiv-
ist will claim that what proponents of the Common Kind Assumption sup-
pose are phenomenally the same are really instances of things not possibly 
being knowably different. Our ascription of such a psychological state to 
John or to the individuals involved in Smith’s examples does not thereby 30
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or incapacities in respect of the judgements they make over and above the 
experiential state so ascribed. When we ascribe such a state to someone, 
the focus is not on the actual psychological states that they go into in re-
sponse to having an experience, or even on what states they would or 
might go into were conditions other than they are. To talk of the imper-
sonal indiscriminability focuses on the mode of what is to be known 
about, or what is to be known about itself. It is to talk about the experien-
tial situation.
6. But it really is not clear how establishing the possibility of impersonal 
claims of indiscriminability will help with our initial problem in respect of 
the dog. While we do use such claims without singling out any specific de-
fects of agents, the example of invisibility still suggests that they are fo-
cused on certain aspects of agents which will not carry over to the case of 
the dog. For example, where we do praise the mend as being invisible, even 
if we need not then speaking of any specific failing in Jones’s sight, still we 
do seem to be talking about sight, a psychological capacity, and what can 
or cannot be known through its use. For example, suppose that the thread 
used for the mend happens to be one which reacts differently to infrared 
radiation from the surrounding textile. Then, while the mending is indeed 
invisible for us, we can conceive of possible ways that sight could have been 
such that the mend was visible after all. So our talk here of invisibility 
seems just to be talk about what it is or is not possible to know through the 
use of sight.
The parallel in the case of the dog is to suppose that our talk of what is 
or is not knowably distinct from perception by introspective reflection is to 
talk about the use of introspective reflection. It is to talk about the means 
or faculty or mechanism, or source of knowledge that introspection pro-
vides and what is or is not knowably distinct through its use. But if it is to 
talk about that, then it is to talk about something which is, strictly speak-
ing, irrelevant to the case of the dog. For the dog, ex hypothesi, lacks the 
power of introspection, no less than an insentient stone does. So whatever 
introspection could or could not tell one about the situation the dog is in, 
it could not be telling the dog that, since the dog is not in a position to use 
it. And, one add, it hardly helps to talk of what one could know through 
introspection were one in the situation of the dog. That would raise two 
obvious problems: what would it be about the situation which would make 
one’s introspective judgements in that strange counterfactual situation rel-
evant to how things actually are with the dog? And, what is it about the 
dog’s situation that would have to be held fixed into the counterfactual sit-
uation where one introspects? Surely there is no plausible candidate other 31
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plicate what it is for the dog to experience in terms of this counterfactual 
condition.
In fact, this construal of indiscriminability talk raises another problem, 
entirely independent of the issue of the dog. When we suppose that talk of 
what is or is not invisible is to talk about the power or capacity of sight 
with respect to certain objects or circumstances, we should also note that it 
is to talk of certain features of the objects of sight. This is particularly nota-
ble when we consider the invisibility of distinctness: i.e. when objects are 
indiscriminable through the use of sight. It is natural for us to move from 
talking of things being indiscriminable (where that is not tied to some spe-
cific incapacity of the judge in question) to them thereby sharing some-
thing, a look or appearance. And if this transition from talk of 
indiscriminability to sameness of appearance is warranted in general, then 
the disjunctivist’s commitment to hallucination being impersonally indis-
criminable from veridical perception will lead us to talk of them sharing an 
appearance, in conflict with commitment (III). 
For example, suppose someone presents you with a cunningly crafted 
bar of soap which looks just like an Amalfi lemon. Sometimes people craft 
soap to look lemon-like while still obviously being nothing other than 
soap; but we can imagine a master craftsman of soap sculpture making a 
soap lemon so perfectly that there is no way to tell the bar of soap from a 
genuine lemon, just with the naked eye. In this case the bar of soap and a 
real lemon may well be visually indiscriminable. And in saying this, I don’t 
mean merely to be saying that I, with little interest in the particular ways in 
which the surface of lemons are textured when waxed and when not, can-
not tell them apart, but rather than one just couldn’t tell them apart. This 
impossibility of telling things apart comes with a certain objectivity at-
tached to it. It is a fact about the two items that they are not to be told 
apart through sight alone. Someone would be mistaken if they thought 
that they could so discern them. For example, we might imagine an over-
confident television chef convinced that he can spot the real lemon from 
the bar of soap. Moreover we may suppose that, purely by chance, what he 
picks as the real lemon is indeed the genuine article. In explaining his suc-
cess the chef might claim that there was just a special way that the lemon 
looked which the soap did not, and which keyed him in to the right an-
swer. Now even though the chef happened on the correct item, still this 
claim is wrong, if the two genuinely are indiscriminable through sight. The 
chef is lucky in his choice, but his success is not grounded in how anything 
looked or how anything appeared to him, given that he was seeing things 
as they were.29
29. Charles Travis insisted on this point to me. Cf. also (Austin 1962)Ch.5.32
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ment (or lack of them) but also something about the objects in question: 
in being visually indiscriminable they share something: the same appear-
ance, or look. What is true of looks and lemons is true too of smells and 
tastes: if two wines just could not be told apart by use of the palate, then 
the two wines do share a taste; if two rags cannot be distinguished by the 
nose, then there will be a smell in common between them. In general, 
then, with respect to the senses, indiscriminability of objects of sense cor-
relates with a shared appearance, or shared object of sense.
Now this observation, no less than the last, poses a problem for the dis-
junctivist. For suppose that the impersonal talk of indiscriminability al-
lows us to talk of the objects of possible knowledge, just as we can talk of 
the lemon and the soap. Then as when we say that two objects indiscrimi-
nable through sight must share a look or appearance, it seems as if we 
should say the same will hold for introspective indiscriminability. If the 
hallucination really is indiscriminable through introspective reflection 
from the perception, then the hallucination has something detectible in 
common with the perception, an inner appearance, or (one may feel the 
temptation to say) a phenomenal character. Note that this would give us a
phenomenal sameness between the two, as proposed by the alternative re-
sponse to commitment (II), but it would not yet give us what the Com-
mon Kind Assumption requires, that the most specific character of the 
veridical experience is shared with the matching hallucination. But, of 
course, to grant this would be to give up on commitment (III). For that 
claimed that all that need be in common is that the hallucination is indis-
criminable from the perception. But what the above line of reasoning sug-
gests is that the way in which objects may be so indiscriminable is really 
only through sharing an appearance, and hence that will be an additional 
feature over and beyond the merely negative epistemological property of 
being not knowably distinct from the perception.
We have two problems here at either end of the claim of indiscrimina-
bility. First, if we take the claim of impersonal indiscriminability about in-
trospective reflection to be parallel to that for sight, then such ascriptions 
will only be significant in relation to the sense experience of creatures 
which possess such a mode of coming to know. So unless the disjunctivist 
can offer some other interpretation, conditions (II) and (III) will be inap-
plicable to the case of the dog. Second, when we consider the use of such 
judgements in relation to the senses, such as sight, then we see that when 
impersonal indiscriminability holds, so too does such a sharing of a prop-
erty detected through that sense: if the lemon and soap are visibly indis-
criminable, then they have in common their visual appearance. Now I 
want to suggest that the two problems are linked. We are led to posit a 
common appearance in relation to sight because we think of sight as a 33
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sons, already partly gestured at in passing, for not thinking of introspec-
tion in this way. This gives us a reason to deny that indiscriminability 
requires a common appearance property in the case of introspection. But, 
in turn, it forces us one step further. If we are not to think of introspection 
as a mode or source of knowledge along the lines of claims about the visi-
bility or invisibility of objects, how are we to construe them?
Recall that claims of indiscriminability are to be read as claims about 
the impossibility of knowing relative to some mode that two things are not 
identical, or that one thing is not a member of a given kind. So in general 
there is no entailment from something’s being not possibly knowably not 
an F to its being an F, or even some other G. There is no entailment from 
not being able to know through sight that the bar of soap is not a lemon to 
the claim that there is thereby something both the bar of soap and the lem-
on are which one can know through sight. What more need the two objects 
have in common than just that sight isn’t a way of telling that the one is 
different from the other?
Yet, having underlined that point, we should also note that the move to 
the positive claim that there is an appearance that the bar of soap and the 
lemon share is one which is entirely natural for us to make. Moreover this 
is not just the observation that the most obvious way for something to be a 
fake lemon is for it to have such visible properties in common with lemons 
as shape and colour. Rather, it seems as if a mild form of verificationism is 
called for in this area, even if it is applied only within a very limited pur-
view. In the case of visually observable phenomena, our use of sight in 
good viewing conditions is an appropriate way to come to know of the 
presence, or absence, of such phenomena. Vision, at least in optimal cir-
cumstances, is a way of coming to know things about one’s environment, 
which things being those that vision is appropriate to tell one about. When 
one fails to tell apart the lemon and the soap, the failure is not a matter of 
the breakdown of the visual system or the conditions for viewing these ob-
jects. So if vision is normally a way of telling whether things are thus and 
so within the visible world, then the fact that vision cannot tell our two ob-
jects apart suggests that there is something that it does detect in common 
between them.30 And that fact, that there is something to be picked up on 
here, we mark with talk of the look, the visual appearance or just the ap-
pearance which the two things share.31
30. We should note one extra complication here. It is not clear that we would talk of a distinctive look 
that lemons have if we lived in an environment in which there were many non-lemons which also 
looked just the way that lemons look. So that we talk of a distinctive look of lemons may require that 
the bars of soap we talk about here are something of an anomaly.
31. Compare here Crispin Wright’s discussion of observational knowledge in, (Wright 1982) and 
Christopher Peacocke’s various accounts of observational concepts in, (Peacocke 1983) Ch.4, (Pea-
cocke 1986), Ch.1 and(Peacocke 1992).34
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vision (and, one might also suggest, in the cases of taste and smell32), then 
the move is natural to make where we suppose that we are using a source of 
knowledge in relation to a realm which exists independently of any one 
perceiver’s exercise of the relevant faculty. We talk of the objects having 
something in common when not distinguished by one’s senses because the 
use of one’s senses is a way of determining how things are in the world in-
dependent of that exercise. We can then mark that it is not some particular 
limitation, or failure, on one’s part, or a failure in one’s senses by treating 
the objective indiscernibility as a positive appearance. The same story will 
apply to the case of introspection, therefore, only if we suppose that in self-
awareness or the exercise of introspective reflection also one is detecting 
features of some realm of facts given independently of one’s introspection, 
such that there can be a failure to tell apart which is not a matter simply of 
a subjective failing on the part of the individual enquirer.
7. This seems to raise a broader and more familiar question: To what extent 
is introspection like perception or observation? If we should think of intro-
spective contact with phenomenal conscious as relevantly similar to per-
ceptual observation of objects, then the same move will be natural to make 
concerning a common appearance to introspection. It has become fairly 
popular to insist that introspection is not a form of inner observation, and 
to point out that there are key disanalogies between introspection and per-
ception.33 A more specific question concerns us here, though: Do any such 
disanalogies undermine the reasoning from indiscriminability to sameness 
of appearance? Rather than rehearse general grounds for contrasting intro-
spection and perception, I want to present a line of reasoning which de-
rives from the considerations we already expressed on behalf of the 
disjunctivist in respect of commitment (II) above.
One familiar observation is that introspection contrasts with the sense 
modalities in allowing of no seems/is distinction. For when we employ our 
senses to find out about the world around us, we acknowledge the possibil-
ity that things may seem a certain way to us visually or tactually without 
32. The case is somewhat more complex for these senses, though, for we consider smells and tastes to 
be the proper objects of these senses, in the way that a visual appearance of an object is not. To put the 
thought somewhat picturesquely, we can imagine an olfactory world inhabited solely by smells, with 
the smells in question linked only extrinsically to any of the common objects in the world around us; 
we don’t conceive of the visible world as primarily occupied just by visible appearances (although per-
haps some sense-datum theorists have been seduced into thinking this). Rather we suppose visible 
objects which possess visual appearances occupy a visual world.
33. For some flavour of the varieties of discussion here see Sydney Shoemaker in, (Shoemaker 1984 
(originally published Journal of Philosophy1968)), (Shoemaker 1995); (Shoemaker 1994); also compare 
(Anscombe 1975); (Burge 1996); (Wright 1989); (Wright 1998); (Moran 2001). For those who still 
favour something like an observational model, however, see (Armstrong 1968), (Chisholm 1969) 
and(Macdonald 1998).35
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employment of a mode of sensing can deliver knowledge of some subject 
matter – the use of one’s eyes, or one’s nose, or one’s palate is a perfectly 
proper way to know of the size or colour of something, how it smells, 
whether a wine is ready to drink. But in disfavourable circumstances a sub-
ject can unwittingly go wrong in judgement through attempting to use his 
or her senses as they would in the best possible circumstances. In such a 
situation a subject may be mistaken in judgement but not at fault (epis-
temically) in the judgement he or she makes. When that happens the sub-
ject conforms her judgement to how things sensorily seem to her, even 
though how things seem is not how they are.34 Since there are objective 
conditions for the correct functioning of our senses, we can conceive of the 
possibility of circumstances in which both things seem a certain way to the 
subject and the subject lacks knowledge because the conditions are not op-
timal for the operation of their senses.35
The idea that no such contrast can be drawn with respect to the inner 
realm is sometimes put by saying that we have direct or immediate access 
to our own phenomenal states.36 But that is a somewhat misleading slo-
gan. A naïve realist about perception will insist in the case of veridical per-
ception that  one does have direct  or  immediate access  to the 
environmental objects and facts which one perceives. The possibility that 
there can be cases in which one is subject to illusion and hence liable to er-
ror is not ruled out by the fact that in certain other cases one has direct ac-
cess to the objects of awareness. So we can express the key idea in its 
simplest form just by ruling out the relevant parallel story for introspec-
tion that we tell for sense perception. That is to say, introspection is not 
like this: There are optimal circumstances for the exercise of one’s intro-
spective faculty. When such circumstances obtain, one can acquire knowl-
edge about one’s phenomenal consciousness through exercising the 
faculty. In less than optimal circumstances, however, attempting to employ 
the introspective faculty will not issue in introspective knowledge. In such 
circumstances a subject who does not know that the situation is disfavour-
able may well be reasonable in making the introspective judgements that 
he or she does, for such judgements will match the way that things intro-
34. The discussion here is intended to remain neutral on the question whether we should say a subject 
uses the same methods of enquiry across favourable and disfavourable circumstances – whether we 
should say that a subject uses the same methods of enquiry when really seeing as when merely having a 
visual hallucination.
35. Matters could be formulated slightly more carefully here. A subject could have knowledge in such 
circumstances, if on the basis of ancillary information they can know that in such circumstances, the 
environment can only be a certain way. For example, one can imagine an individual who knows that 
they are induced to have a visual hallucination of a pink elephant only in the presence of pink ele-
phants and so comes to know that there is a pink elephant nearby when it seems to them a pink ele-
phant is nearby. If we focus on cases of demonstrative knowledge (‘That is a pink elephant’) and 
knowledge only derivable from demonstrative knowledge, then the complication may not be required.
36. E.g., (Sturgeon), (Chalmers 1996).36
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things are phenomenally, and hence the judgement in question will not be 
knowledge.37 Were this a genuine possibility, we could always significantly 
contrast how a subject’s inner life seems to her with how it actually is: there 
would be the possibility (or at least conceivability) that things might mere-
ly seem to be the way she judges them to be. In denying that there is a gen-
uine seems/is distinction we are saying that we do not conceive this as a 
genuine possibility, and hence that the story told is to be ruled out.
Now in ruling this out as a coherent possibility, one denies that there 
are any situations in which, from the subject’s perspective on her situation, 
her mind seems one way to her, and yet is another. It does not require one 
to take a stand on whether one can make mistakes in one’s self-ascriptive 
judgements. There is no reason to claim that these must be incorrigible or 
even infallible. Nor need one rule out the possibility that a subject may be 
entirely deluded about his or her own mind, just as one can be deluded 
about the world. Part of the point of Smith’s examples discussed earlier is 
to highlight exactly how one can be so afflicted: through hallucinogenic 
medication, schizophrenic delusion, or simply hypnotic suggestion. Rather 
than rule these cases out, though, the insistence that there is no seems/is 
distinction highlights the epistemological irrelevance of these cases. A sub-
ject who is deluded into supposing that he now experiences angels talking 
to him need not be rationally responding to how things sensorily seem to 
him. That is, it need not be the case that the subject has a sensory experi-
ence as of angels, and is rationally responding to that.38 Rather it may be 
that, regardless of the actual way in which the subject experiences the 
world, he responds in the non-rational way of judging there to be angels 
there. Likewise, we do not have to suppose that someone deluded about 
the state of his or her own mind, for example as to whether he is having a 
particular kind of experience, is misled by how his mind appears to him to 
be. Rather, the subject is deluded in the way that he forms his judgements 
in the first place, and these are not properly constrained by any grounds. 
When we deny that one can make sense of the seems/is distinction in this 
realm, all that need be denied is that we can make sense of a subject’s situa-
tion being this way: describing how things seem or are from the subject’s 
point of view characterises his phenomenal consciousness one way; at-
tending to how things really are, requires that we describe it another way.
There is widespread (although not universal) support for the idea that 
there can be no interesting distinction here between how one’s phenome-
37. This description sounds much like the scenario which Smith attributes to the disjunctivist concern-
ing hallucination. So one might explain the intuitive force of Smith’s rejection of that picture with the 
conviction that for the inner realm there is no seems/is distinction.
38. Of course, it is an open question whether any psychotic or pathological delusions do involve a form 
of sensory illusion or hallucination. That they do so, is one active hypothesis in response to certain 
pathologies of belief, cf. (Davies and Coltheart 2000).37
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why this should be so is not so widespread. I want to contrast two explana-
tions. One holds onto an aspect of the idea that introspection is a particu-
lar kind of source, or mechanism, for knowing about an aspect of the 
world, just as the senses are. It may not have any visible organ, and it may 
not involve a particular kind of mental state which we would call intro-
spective experience, but still it is a means by which we can come to track an 
aspect of reality and know things about it. That is to say, with the senses we 
suppose not only that there are physical processes which underpin their 
operation, but that we can conceive of a privileged set of such processes 
whose correct operation is required for a given sense to be operating prop-
erly. Introspection will be, or rest on, a particular mechanism, if the proc-
esses which subserve it allow for the same distinction between the 
conditions for proper operation and their absence. The other approach 
takes the collapse of the seems/is distinction to indicate that there can be 
no such mechanism of introspection. I shall argue that the disjunctivist is 
implicitly committed to this latter model.
One might suggest that what those who claimed that our introspective 
knowledge of phenomenal consciousness is direct or immediate intended 
by this talk is to rule out the possibility of certain kinds of error; perhaps 
on the assumption that such errors would arise only if some intermediary 
of some form played a role. Recall the point we stressed in relation to com-
mitment (II): the impossibility of one’s experience merely seeming a cer-
tain way without being so is not established solely by supposing that 
phenomenal states have the distinctive property of being self-intimating, 
by which I mean: being such that a subject who is in such a state is thereby 
in a position to know that she is in it.40 The self-intimating nature of phe-
nomenal states would rule out the possibility of its seeming to one as if one 
was presented with a pink square, when really one’s experience presented 
solely a red triangle. For in having an experience as of a red triangle and 
nothing else, one would thereby be in a position to know that one’s experi-
ence was that way. But being in a position to know one’s experience is that 
way rules out not knowing that one’s experience is not a way incompatible 
with being that way. Hence it cannot seem to the subject as if the experi-
39. However, it should also be noted that the denial of a seems/is distinction is in tension with the 
claim that, given introspective support for naïve realism, the only consistent sense-datum or inten-
tional theory of perception will have to adopt an error theory of phenomenal consciousness. For that 
seems to require that how our sense experience seems to us to be, namely naïve realist, does not match 
how it really is. That this is indeed the best way to read the history of the debate about the problem of 
perception, I argue in (Martin 2001). I’ll mention below how the disjunctivist can reconcile this ten-
sion. For other theorists, I suggest it indicates not the lack of introspective support for naïve realism, 
but the failure of theorists to face up to the cost of endorsing a theory of perception in conflict with 
appearances.
40. See (Williams 1978) appendix; and also (Alston 1989), for  attempts to tease out the competing the-
ses about the special epistemological access we have to our own minds.38
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over to any case in which the subject is failing to experience the world as 
being any particular way at all. In such circumstances, there would be no 
way experientially the subject would be which could intimate to the sub-
ject that he or she was that way. Rather we simply have the absence of any 
experiential state. So if it is not going to be possible for the subject to be in 
the error-inducing situation of its seeming as if he or she is experientially a 
certain way when not, then the explanation must trace to the means by 
which this seeming can be brought about. Hence it must trace to the 
means one uses in forming introspective judgements.
Given this, the claim of directness of introspective judgement adds an 
explanation here only if it is interpreted in one of two ways. First, it may be 
supposed that the means for coming to a judgement on experience is such 
that it is never possible for it to go wrong. If one employs it to determine 
whether one is having one kind of experience or another, or not having 
sense experience at all, then this means will have to give the right answer. 
Alternatively, one may claim that, even if the introspective mechanism it-
self can go wrong, and so potentially deliver the wrong answer, still the op-
eration of this mechanism is something epistemically transparent to one: 
one can know when one attempts to use it whether one is succeeding in us-
ing it correctly. So in that circumstance, there couldn’t be a situation in 
which a subject was not in a position to know that he or she couldn’t know 
whether things were a certain way introspectively. This alternative allows 
introspective mechanisms to be ordinary mechanisms within the world, 
prone as anything to breakdown and to improper use. But it hypothesises 
for the rational agent one level up a means whose operation is, at least in 
principle, perfect: one just couldn’t fail with due attention to determine 
whether one was doing things right.41
Now many writers have been suspicious of the positing of any such per-
fect means of coming to know about the inner realm. So it has been com-
mon to suppose instead that the denial of the seems/is contrast here 
indicates instead that introspective access cannot be by some distinctive 
means or mode of coming to know one’s mind. Again to stress: this 
thought cannot be captured simply by the claim that our access to our 
phenomenal states is direct or immediate: that might help explain in the 
good cases, when we are confronted with phenomenal reality why we are 
bound to get it right; but it doesn’t by itself help explain why there are no 
bad cases, why there shouldn’t be situations in which we are not properly 
41. Strictly speaking, this is not the only alternative hypothesis. For, of course, one could hypothesise 
that this mechanism too is potentially faulty, but that a third mechanism is perfect and so indicates to 
one when the second mechanism fails. One would thereby never be in a position not to know that 
introspection does not reveal things the way that they are. This account, too, posits a perfect mecha-
nism. There is an infinity of such accounts, each of which posits as its limiting mechanism a perfect 
one.39
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are unable to detect why not. The requirement of super-mechanisms 
comes only at this stage. Rather, the alternative strategy must question how 
we are to understand the favourable case in which there is no question but 
that the subject is in a position to have introspective knowledge.
Consider again the parallel with sense perception. Suppose that the 
subject is in a position to make judgements because of the correct opera-
tion of some mechanism, and that the mechanism in question is an ordi-
nary part of the world whose workings can be investigated as any other. 
Then there is a conceivable situation in which such investigation reveals 
the mechanism not to be operating correctly, but in which a subject is still 
liable to make judgements about his or her own state of mind. If the sub-
ject’s judgement has the status of knowledge in virtue of the correct opera-
tion of the mechanism, then in such circumstances the subject would 
merely be making an introspective judgement and would not possess 
knowledge. If the subject is a rational being in this situation, then the less-
than-knowledgeable judgement would conform merely to phenomenal 
consciousness’s seeming some way to one, and not to how it really is. Since, 
by hypothesis, this is ruled out, there are only two possibilities: the one we 
have already canvassed, that the mechanism is such that it cannot fail or 
can only fail when it is knowable that it has; and the other that there is no 
such mechanism in the first place. In denying that there is a mechanism of 
introspection, one need not deny that there are certain physical conditions 
under which someone makes an introspective judgement. One need not 
deny that there are sufficient conditions for introspective knowledge. In 
the case of the senses, we add to this a contrast between circumstances in 
which the sense operates correctly and situations in which it does not. 
What is ruled out here is the possibility of specifying a mechanism, such 
that there could be a way that it goes wrong. In contrast to the sense mo-
dalities there is no particular means, or set of means, which are the intro-
spective ones by which one derives knowledge of the inner realm. However 
things seem from the subject’s perspective with respect to her phenomenal 
consciousness is how phenomenal consciousness must be, regardless of 
whether that seeming issues from a specific set of mechanisms that we had 
otherwise picked out as the introspection supporting ones.
There is a parallel here with the original moral we drew concerning 
commitment (II). Recall that when we fix on a circumstance as one of pos-
sibly having a visual hallucination of a white picket fence, we are con-
cerned with things being not knowably distinct from seeing a white picket 
fence from the subject’s point of view. Given a modest conception of sense 
experience, this condition does not require that one’s normal means of 
gaining visual knowledge has actually been employed, or that it has result-
ed in a mental state with exactly the same characteristics as normally occur 40
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subject’s perspective, things shouldn’t appear any different from a situation 
in which one has used one’s powers of sight appropriately and thereby 
come into visual contact with the world. Any of the various means for 
bringing about visual experience will, from this conception, give one suffi-
cient conditions for having visual experience, and not any necessary condi-
tion independent of commitment (II).
In relation to phenomenal consciousness itself and introspection, the 
lesson is that we take ‘from the subject’s point of view’ as, so to speak, a 
fixed point. If it seems to the subject as if it seems to the subject that there 
is a white picket fence before her, then it seems to the subject as if there is a 
white picket fence before her. So there can be no privileged mechanism 
which is required for her to be able to get right the judgement about how 
things seem to her. The subject’s perspective on her own sense experience 
constitutes sense experience being that way for her.42
Hence, the disjunctivist has every reason to reject the idea that intro-
spection is like perception. Introspective judgement cannot result from the 
correct operation of a specific mechanism of introspection without the 
possibility of one’s phenomenal consciousness merely seeming some way 
to one. Since that is not possible, specifying how things seem to the subject 
does not introduce a perspective the subject occupies independent of the 
subject matter she thereby takes an interest in. Now this conclusion bears 
directly both on the case of common appearances and on our understand-
ing of how dogs can be credited sense experience in the light of the dis-
junctivist’s commitments.
8. In the case of the lemon and the soap, we move from visual indiscrimi-
nability to a shared look via the further observation that the two objects 
cannot be told apart is an objective feature of them which one’s use of sight 
tracks. But, as we have just seen, unless one wishes to posit a perfect mech-
anism of introspection (or tracking the use of mechanisms), we cannot 
suppose that one’s take on how things are experientially is independent of 
what it is a take on, rather these two must coincide. The impersonality of 
one’s incapacity to distinguish the two situations of veridical perception 
42. Various authors have discussed theories of self-knowledge positing constitutive relations between 
the self-ascription of thoughts and the thoughts so self-ascribed. See, for example, (Heal 1994), 
(Wright 1989). A common concern with such theories is that they deprive the higher-order ascription 
from having a rational ground in the subject matter it concerns, cf. (Peacocke 1998). The same con-
cerns are not in play here. The constitutive connection is between the subject’s perspective on his or 
her own mind, how it seems to be, and how his or her mind then is. This need not be identified with 
the judgements he or she actually makes. As we have already noted, an agent may be inattentive or even 
deluded in their judgements even about the inner realm, so the connection drawn is consistent with 
supposing that self-ascriptive judgements of experience are both cognitive achievements and grounded 
in how things seem and are.41
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spection. For when we say that things seem a certain way to the subject, 
now with respect to her own state of mind, we are not hypothesising that 
she is in the best possible circumstances to tell how things seem to her, and 
yet still cannot find a difference between this situation and the one of ve-
ridically perceiving. The hypothesised situation is simpler than that: if she 
really is in a situation in which from her perspective it is as if she is having 
an experience as of a white picket fence, then that constitutes her being in 
the situation of having an experience as of a white picket fence.
And, in turn, this shows us that the impersonal ascription of introspec-
tive indiscriminability cannot be used to talk about the limitations of a giv-
en faculty or mechanism of introspection, as the parallel claims about 
indiscriminability through sight can be. There is no relevant mechanism of 
introspection to be talked about unless there can be super-mechanisms, 
incapable of going wrong. One cannot show the irrelevance of these claims 
to the case of the dog, therefore, by pointing out that the dog lacks the rel-
evant mode of introspective access, for if our reasoning is correct, the dif-
ference between us and the dog cannot be put down to the presence of any 
distinctive mechanism of introspection anyway.
What then, do we do when we ascribe sense experience to the dog? In 
ascribing consciousness to a creature, we are thereby ascribing to it a point 
of view or perspective on the world. This is a feature which the naïve realist 
about perception in particular will want to stress, although its claim on us 
is recognised far more widely. From a subject’s perspective experience is a 
matter (at least in part) of various objects being apparent to it, some part 
of the actual world making an appearance to one. The naïve realist, at least 
in the case of veridical perception, wishes us to understand this way of 
talking literally: veridical perceptual experience is constituted through one 
standing in a relation of awareness to the objects of perception. The same 
won’t carry over to hallucination, though. So in general there is a question 
how experience being a point of view on the world, and the non-necessity 
of the actual world being present to the subject are to fit together.
The disjunctivist is moved to claim that the kind of apprehension that 
one has of the object of sense in the case of veridical perception is entirely 
absent when one has a causally matching hallucination. It is not that one 
fails to apprehend some aspect of the physical world and yet still latches on 
to something else, some inner object or sense-datum. Rather, in such cases, 
the subject has experience yet fails to apprehend anything at all. So if hav-
ing conscious experience involves having a point of view on the world, 
then having such a point of view cannot require the actual apprehension of 
anything. This suggests that when we grasp the idea of there being a situa-
tion which from the subject’s point of view is just as if one is veridically 
perceiving but in which one is not, no commitment at all need be made in 42
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thing, even if they are not aware of, for example, a white picket fence.
This much, I take it, even an intentionalist about perceptual experience 
will be inclined to accept. For the intentionalist both wants to agree that we 
should characterise experience when perceiving in terms of the actual ob-
jects of perception, and yet deny that any other objects fill this role when 
we hallucinate. So both the intentionalist and the disjunctivist will agree 
that in the case of hallucination it is as if the subject is being presented with 
objects which are not in fact there. The intentionalist wishes to add a fur-
ther claim, one that the disjunctivist will deny – namely that this fact about 
the situation holds in virtue of the hallucination having a certain property 
which the veridical perception shares, namely having a certain representa-
tional content. The disjunctivist denies this (in committing to (III)) since 
the disjunctivist insists that the veridical perception is a genuinely relation-
al state, as the naïve realist claims, and not something of a kind which 
could equally be present in the case of hallucination. But the key point re-
mains for both: that we cannot capture how things are from the subject’s 
point of view without reference to what is only true in cases of veridical 
perception. The disjunctivist’s commitment to (II) can be read, therefore, 
as articulating this thought: that we can only characterise how things are 
from the subject’s perspective by reference to the veridical circumstance. In 
turn, the commitment to (III) indicates that in the case of hallucination we 
need not commit to the subject successfully picking up on anything be-
yond being in this circumstance of its being just as if one is in the case of 
veridical perception.
A consequence of the formulation of (II) and (III) is that to articulate 
properly what is involved in being in this situation, we must make mention 
of perception (a kind of mental state) and one’s ability to discriminate one 
kind of situation in which one has a point of view on the world from other 
such situations (it is for the dog as if there are sausages there, not carrots). 
And for creatures such as ourselves, self-aware and self-conscious human 
beings, having such experience, with such a perspective on the world puts 
us in a position to articulate our plight. Any of us, suitably linguistically 
sophisticated, can move back from judgements about the environment 
surrounding us to judgements which simply concern our experiential po-
sition. As Strawson observed, experience must make room for the thought 
of experience itself.43 Yet that is not to say that when we ascribe such expe-
rience to other creatures, we must thereby assume that they too are self-
conscious or self-aware, even though how we conceive of their experience 
is such that, were a creature so to experience and be self-conscious, they 
would thereby be able to articulate judgements just as we in fact do.
43. (Strawson 1966) p.101.43
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therefore nothing which has been added to phenomenal consciousness and 
through which we come to be aware of how the character of phenomenal 
consciousness when we contrast our situation with that of the dog. It 
seeming to the subject that things seem a certain way to her can constitute 
things seeming that way to her. So for a self-aware subject, phenomenal 
consciousness can thereby exemplify self-awareness in itself. That which in 
us is simply a mode of self-awareness is what we attribute to other crea-
tures even when we do not take them to be self-aware. So the conditions in 
(II) and (III) attribute experience to the dog through attributing a specific 
take on the world, without thereby presupposing that the dog is self-aware. 
In sum, although there is a temptation to suppose that when we look to 
what must be true of different creatures when they all enjoy a sense experi-
ence of a kind of scene, and not just a veridical perception of some particu-
lar instance, that there must positively be some phenomenal characteristics 
as such which they all share, the disjunctivist denies this and can do so 
quite consistently. For the disjunctivist what they must all have in common 
is just that their situations are impersonally indiscriminable through re-
flection from a veridical perception. What it takes for a creature so to satis-
fy this condition may well involve levels of similarity other than at that of 
experiential sameness – the same neurological organisation and function-
ing may be nomologically required in order that creatures genuinely be in-
discriminable from each other from the perspective of within. This may 
thereby make true broadly similar functional truths by which certain ap-
proaches to the mind have sought to define mental kinds. Where the dis-
junctivist sticks is with supposing that these commonalities must sub-serve 
or define an experiential commonality where that requires more than the 
sharing of the negative epistemological condition.44
9. We have now rehearsed the various grounds for the disjunctivist to resist 
the characterisation of his or her position that Smith sketches. The picture 
of causally matching hallucination as a case of unknown absent qualia is 
forced on the disjunctivist where we have to accept that one’s introspective 
focus on experience is from a perspective on one’s phenomenal experience, 
where the status of the latter is fixed independent of one’s appreciation of 
44. Likewise the proposal here should not be read as claiming that to ascribe experience to the dog is to 
say that were it self-aware it would not be able to tell its situation from one in which it perceived a 
bunch of carrots; or to say that were an ideally reflective agent to be in the dog’s situation then it would 
not be able to know it is not perceiving a bunch of carrots. Both of these claims may be true (though it 
is easy to see also how they may be falsified – perhaps dogs would be insensitive to carrots if self-aware; 
perhaps ideally reflective agents have very different experience from dogs). But neither can be what we 
mean to talk of when we ascribe experience to dogs, at best they would trade on that understanding. 
The counterfactuals in question might be intended as part of a reductive account of what it is to have 
experience, but then, apart from the worries to which we have already gestured, the disjunctivist would 
also be liable to resist the account since the applicability of the counter-factual condition would be lia-
ble to seek for a common grounding in dogs across cases of perception and hallucination specified in 
terms other than drawn from (II), and hence would be inconsistent with (III).44
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and (III) are naturally read only as conditions on that awareness, not con-
ditions on experience itself.
In contrast, in discussion of the contrast between introspection and ob-
servation, and the application of this to the case of the dog, we can see that 
conditions (II) and (III) are rather intended by the disjunctivist as the 
means of characterising what a subject’s perspective, either on the world, 
or on her own experiential situation, can amount to. Or, more exactly, the 
disjunctivist offers this characterisation within the context of making no 
further assumptions about the necessary existence of objects made appar-
ent to that subjective perspective.
The dog, the soap and the lemon together indicate why Smith’s picture 
does not capture the situation as conceived by the disjunctivist. First, when 
we say of a victim of causally matching hallucination that his or her situa-
tion is one of not being knowably distinct from veridical perception of, say, 
a white picket fence, we need not there be talking of the specific intellectual 
capacities or incapacities possessed by that very individual; we need not be 
saying that this person is quite capable or rather incapable of exercising ca-
pacities for coming to know things about the world. Rather, our focus is on 
the impersonal fact that the subjective perspective, that of introspective re-
flection, cannot discern the difference between a situation of causally 
matching hallucination and that of veridical perception. This fact is what is 
common between the dog, which lacks any powers of self-conscious judge-
ment, and us, in as much as there is anything experientially in common 
between merely sentient creatures and self-aware agents such as mature 
human beings.
Second, this subjective perspective on the situation does not pick out an 
independent vantage point from which two possible objects of comparison 
are to be told apart, or treated as in some respect the same. It is common to 
deny that one’s phenomenal consciousness could merely seem some way to 
one without being so – that, after all, is part of the grounds of incredulity 
in Smith’s objection to the disjunctivist proposal. In accepting this, the dis-
junctivist points out that the perspective we have on our own phenomenal 
consciousness cannot, then, be grounded in some specific mode or source 
of knowing about something independent of that perspective. If it is true 
of someone that it seems to them as if things seem a certain way, as if they 
are having a certain sense experience, then they are thereby having that ex-
perience. Our reflective standpoint on our own experience cannot stand 
outside of it.
So given this, the disjunctivist can point out that in characterising the 
subject’s circumstance in a case of causally matching hallucination as one 
of not knowably not being a case of veridical perception of a white picket 
fence, one has thereby characterised how things seem to the subject, and so 45
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scious, then there is something that it is like for him or her to be so. That 
there is something that it is like for the subject is given by the fact that we 
are characterising how things seem to them, namely that they seem in just 
the way they would seem to him or her were he or she veridically perceiv-
ing a white picket fence. What more could be required in order to specify a 
way that one can be experientially?45
At the same time, in spelling out how the disjunctivist seeks to rebut 
Smith’s complaint, we are better placed to see what the deeper disagree-
ment is between the two views. To resist Smith’s characterisation of the 
case of causally matching hallucination is not to deny that there is a signif-
icant disagreement here, and one which connects with many people’s intu-
itions about the case of phenomenal consciousness and our knowledge of 
it. Rather, it is to suggest that the disagreement relates not to any denial or 
affirmation of the presence of phenomenal consciousness in the case of 
some hallucinations, but rather the kind of self-awareness or introspective 
knowledge that one can have of phenomenal consciousness. The disjunc-
tivist can take (III) to characterise sufficiently the subjective character of a 
subject’s state of mind because they suppose we have no reason to claim 
that the only possible way in which one can come to have sense experience 
is through actually apprehending some object.
Return to Smith’s complaint. As initially stated, it seems to affirm the 
kind of position familiar from early sense-datum theorists: how can things 
be this way if there is no object of awareness for me to sense? One can hap-
pily endorse Smith’s objection here, only if one does think that what is dis-
tinctive of sense experience in any circumstance of occurrence is the 
presence of some actual object of sensing: that one can only be sensuously 
a certain way, where a genuine object of sensuous attention is provided for 
one’s focus. That, of course, is not Smith’s intention. Although he does 
think that there are actualised aspects of sense experience, the sensuous 
object of attention is not one of them.46 So the complaint of absence here 
cannot literally be taken to be that of complaining that hallucination can 
involve the absence of an object of awareness. All theorists apart from 
sense-datum theorists accept that fact: they accept that there is something 
about the situation in the case of veridical perception which somehow is 
not reflected in the case of hallucination, even if otherwise we are to say 
that the two are experientially the same.
45. In this way, too, we can see how the disjunctivist can consistently agree that there is no seems/is dis-
tinction for sense experience, and yet that there is something essentially deceptive about the case of 
perfect hallucination. The essentially deceptive element relates to the subject’s seemingly being in a 
position of awareness without in fact being aware of anything.
46. (Smith 2002), Ch.9.46
On Being AlienatedSo, if the complaint against the disjunctivist is one of a supposed ab-
sence in the case of hallucination, one which a Common Kind Theorist 
can avoid, then the absence must be, so to speak, one level up, an absence 
purely at the level of how things are experientially with the subject, and not 
with the objects of such experience. Here, I suggest, is where we do find a 
deep disagreement which it is difficult to articulate arguments for or 
against.  
What pushes the initial worry we started out with, I suggest, is the con-
viction that there must be more to causally matching hallucination. In 
reading this, you are not currently hallucinating. The disjunctivist agrees 
that there is more to your experience than just the negative epistemological 
property of being indiscriminable from this veridical perception, there is 
the positive character of the veridical perception itself. But now, one wants 
to say, just as I can tell that there is more in this case, so too I would be 
equally placed in the case of causally matching hallucination, so there must 
be something I am picking up on, the phenomenal character which has 
been left out by the disjunctivist. To adopt this position, I’ve suggested, is 
to suppose that we can fix the facts of phenomenal consciousness inde-
pendently of the higher-order perspective on it, in as much as we think of 
the latter as correctly reporting or reflecting these additional facts. 
And once we acknowledge this, then we must think of the phenomenal 
facts that we pick up on in this way as being independent of the experience 
being a veridical perception, for the properties in question will have to be 
common to the causally matching hallucination and the veridical percep-
tion it is indiscriminable from. So it could not be that one’s experience be-
ing this  way in itself  (as opposed to being this  way in certain 
circumstances) constituted the kind of contact with one’s environment 
which would explain one’s ability to think about things around one and 
come to know how they are. Moreover, if the naïve realist is right that we 
do conceive of our sensory experience in cases of perception as providing 
such a contact with the world, and we are inclined to understand our abili-
ty to think about and know of these things in terms of such experience, 
then recognising our experience as only a common element to perception 
and hallucination comes at the cost of losing that understanding.
At best, if the disjunctivist has established that naïve realism best char-
acterises how our sensory experience seems to initial reflective intuition, 
the position we end up in here is one of clashing intuitions. For on the one 
hand there is the thought that experience’s being so, as it is now when I ve-
ridically perceive is a matter of my standing in an appropriate relation to 
the world around me. On the other hand, there is the intuition that in this 
circumstance I am able reflectively to pick up on how my experience is and 
the subject of a causally matching hallucination would equally be so placed 47
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hence cannot be relational in this way.
I say that this second claim is something we find intuitive, and apart 
from indicating that we find this plausible, I think it adds two further ele-
ments. The first is that, even if there is something more for us to say as to 
the truth of the relevant condition, we do not immediately appeal to those 
further considerations in order to support the claim. The appeal of the 
thought is more fundamental than that – one can’t really conceive either of 
what experience, or more exactly the kind of perspective we have on expe-
rience could be, if it is not a matter of responding to what is there. The sec-
ond is this. If this is the right place to identify the basic disagreement with 
disjunctivism, one which does not turn on either slips of formulation in 
disjunctivism, or misconception of its consequences, then in as much as 
the objection just seems intuitive, the appropriate strategy for the disjunc-
tivist at this stage is not so much to offer any particular argument against it 
(for after all it is a claim which we accept independently of the further 
elaborations we try to give of why we are so committed) as to explain why 
the principle seems so attractive to us, given that it is false. At this point 
what the disjunctivist needs to do is to engage in philosophical pathology.
In the closing section, I want to begin the sketch of how that might go. 
For, I want to suggest, one way forward is to see a connection here between 
the intuitions here and external world scepticism, although not quite of 
the form that people commonly indicate in these debates.
Part Three
10. I’ve suggested that the root disagreement here relates to the epistemol-
ogy of sense experience and introspective awareness of it, and that this may 
be connected to a response to a sceptical challenge about the external 
world. Now in the introductory section, I suggested that disjunctivism is 
properly seen as connected to a Humean challenge of scepticism with re-
gard to the senses, rather than the more commonly discussed Cartesian 
challenge raised about our empirical knowledge as a whole. I do not intend 
to take that contrast back here, but rather to suggest that a certain kind of 
natural response to the Cartesian challenge may lead us to reject disjunc-
tivism and so have to face the Humean problem head on.
First I want to spell out a bit more the gap between the Humean prob-
lem and the Cartesian one, before spelling out the link which may explain 
the counter-intuitive element in the disjunctivist’s picture of experience. It 
is quite common when discussing empirical knowledge as a whole and its 
reliance on the senses, or in discussing the Cartesian sceptical challenge to 
talk of sense experience as introducing a veil or barrier between one and 48
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cance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud reflects on the situation one 
finds oneself in when taking seriously the sceptical challenge to be found in 
Descartes’s First Meditation:
What can we know in such a predicament?  We can perhaps know what sen-
sory experiences we are having, or how things seem to us to be…We are in 
a sense imprisoned within those representations, at least with respect to our 
knowledge…
This can seem to leave us in the position of finding a barrier between our-
selves and the world around us.  There would then be a veil of sensory ex-
periences or sensory objects which we could not penetrate but which would 
be no reliable guide to the world beyond the veil. ((Stroud 1984), pp. 32-3.)
Stroud suggests that when one is faced with the sceptical challenge, and has 
as yet no satisfactory answer to it, one cannot know, or at least take oneself 
to know, anything about the ordinary world around one, although one can 
know certain things about one’s own mind. In turn, he suggests that in be-
ing in this predicament, one finds sense experience to be a kind of barrier 
or veil between one and the world. So a sceptical doubt which starts from a 
hypothesis about whether one knows oneself to be dreaming or not seems 
to deliver a negative verdict about the nature of sense experience itself.
Although Stroud’s prose offers a smooth transition between the two 
thoughts, the move from external world scepticism to concerns with a bar-
rier between the subject and the experienced world is not as obvious or 
straightforward as it might first appear. Suppose it is true that we have no 
answer to the sceptical challenge, and suppose it also true that in those cir-
cumstances we still possess certain self-knowledge of our own states of 
mind, and of the character of our sense experiences in particular. Why 
should it follow from this alone that sense experience would act as a kind 
of barrier between us and the world? 
Consider the following analogy. You have recently moved into an old 
Boston house and in the attic discovered seemingly a journal from the wars 
of independence. This is an intimate record, and from its close and some-
what obsessive detail, it now seems to you that you know things about the 
day-to-day life in late eighteenth century Massachusetts that you could not 
otherwise have happened on: the journal seems to give you a contact with 
that world. But now add that a malicious neighbour falsely, but seemingly 
authoritatively, informs you that the previous owner of your apartment 
was a fantasist and forger, given to constructing such fancies as the journal. 
The document you possess is not, he claims, a record of that past turbulent 
time, but is rather a cunning and recent fiction imagining how things must 
have been. Under the sway of his disturbing story, you may now feel cut off 
from the contact you seemingly had with the eighteenth century. It need 
not be that you are convinced by his story: you have some sense that he 
likes to deflate people in their pleasures. But with the doubt about the 49
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need some further evidence to indicate that this is not a matter simply of 
fiction. And in this situation you cannot enjoy the journal as once you did. 
Even if the journal is genuine, you are no longer in a position, without 
some further evidence, to exploit the privilege it affords you of looking 
back into the past. You have lost the contact with that time that you found 
so pleasurable. 
So far, the parallel with Stroud’s concern with external world scepticism 
seems close enough, albeit on a smaller terrain. Initially, one seems to have 
a body of knowledge acquired through a particular source or group of 
sources. A sceptical doubt questions the probity of that source. One is not 
deprived of the knowledge of what the source claims is the case about the 
subject matter in question, but one is no longer in a position to trust the 
source, unless one can lay the sceptical doubts to rest. But in this case, I 
suggest, one would balk at the further move that Stroud makes in relation 
to the senses. There is no inclination to say that one should now see the 
journal as somehow a veil or barrier between one and those past events 
whose record one once enjoyed. For it seems, given that the journal is gen-
uine, this indeed does provide a route back to the past, but just one which 
one isn’t now in a position to exploit. Just because one’s neighbour sows 
the seed of doubt about the veracity of the journal, there is no reason to 
think that the journal thereby becomes misleading or fabrication in itself. 
So likewise, we might ask of Stroud’s discussion, why should the fact that 
in taking seriously the sceptical doubts mean that my senses now must act 
as a barrier between me and the world which otherwise they give me con-
tact with, rather than simply being the facilitators of that contact, but in a 
way which I could not now exploit?47
In contrast to this discussion, when we look to Hume, we find a more 
readily intelligible account of why sense experience might be thought of as 
a barrier between us and the world. Hume insists in section XII of the First 
Enquiry that there are different forms of sceptical challenge, some such as 
Descartes’s, antecedent to study, science and enquiry and others conse-
quent on it. He associates with the latter form both ancient arguments 
which trade on conflicting appearances and his own sceptical arguments 
about the senses which he claims offer a more profound challenge than 
47. Tamar Szabó Gendler suggested that the story does not induce the same intuitions because it 
involves temporal separation from its subject matter, while the intuitions about perception concern 
our spatial relation to the objects in question. However, it seems to me that a variant story which per-
ceives the spatial elements does not necessarily lead to Stroud’s intuitions. While one would have the 
sense that a barrier is present if one accepts as true the falsification hypothesis (equivalent of the 
forger), there is no reason to think one’s lack of knowledge of its falsity is enough to make one think of 
the source as a barrier. The main moral of the tale would still remain even if this worry did have some 
grounds: for it would not be the bare structure of the epistemological situation which led to the result. 
Some further assumptions have been buried in the move from sceptical quandary to imprisonment 
behind a veil.50
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convince. He hypothesises that the vulgar suppose themselves to sense ob-
jects independent of them, but that the slightest philosophy will show this 
opinion to be false, and that they perceive only their own impressions or 
images. Hume uses the attribution of such a gross mistake in our concep-
tion of perception to undermine any argument now introduced to show 
that we can nonetheless reliably acquire knowledge through perception of 
the existence of an external world.
Whatever one thinks of the merits of Hume’s argument here, he seems 
correct in supposing that the method of argument is very different from 
that employed by Descartes in the First Meditation. From elsewhere in his 
writings, it is clear that Descartes thinks we have only mediated perception 
of the objects of sense, but that assumption plays no essential role in pre-
senting the dreaming argument or the malin génie. All that Descartes re-
quires is that we can conceive of a situation in which from one’s own 
perspective it is as if one is situated as one is now, but in which one dreams, 
hallucinates or is subject to some external deceptive influence. The hy-
pothesis requires that we have a conception of the difference between nor-
mal perception and mere dreaming or hallucinating. But it does not 
require that we have any particular views about what normal perception 
must involve, beyond the though that it would be a source of knowledge, 
and hence requires us to hazard no view over whether a given sense experi-
ence should fail to count as a perception of the external world, if it has not 
already been hypothesised to be an illusion or hallucination.48 
So we seem to have at least two styles of argument here, both related to 
our knowledge of the external world. The one argument focuses solely on 
the conceivability of a situation in which one is entirely deceived in one’s 
external world judgements, but need not take a view about the nature of 
sense perception itself. The other argument, in contrast, works by ascrib-
ing to us a particular conception of sense perception and then arguing that 
this is mistaken. Talk of the senses being a barrier or a veil between us and 
the world seems much more appropriate in relation to this mode of scepti-
cal challenge. For here the implicit contrast is between how we used to be-
lieve the senses to be, giving us some kind of privileged cognitive contact 
with the world, and how we now believe them to be in the light of Hume’s 
48. Although I am not sure that all parties to the debate would agree. Stroud himself, for example, 
writes, ‘[The philosopher] chooses a situation in which any one of us would unproblematically say or 
think, for example, that we know that there is a fire in the fireplace right before us, and that we know it 
is there because we see that it is there.  But when we ask what this seeing really amounts to, various 
considerations are introduced to lead us to concede that we would see exactly what we see now even if 
no fire was there at all, or if we didn’t know that there was one there.’ (Stroud 2000), p.131. Likewise 
Wright’s reconstruction of the Cartesian reasoning appeals in passing to the assumption that percep-
tion and dreaming involve the same ‘manifest content’ brought about through different dominant 
causal routes, see (Wright 1991), p.91. However, in neither case can I see that the sceptical argument 
requires these additional claims about the nature of sense perception.51
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the vulgar has sceptical potential because it claims to falsify our beliefs 
about how we come to know what we take ourselves to know. While there 
may be no requirement that when one knows something one must also 
know how one comes to know it, for some cases we do have knowledge, or 
at least beliefs about how we have come to know something. I know that 
Warsaw is the capital of Poland. I am not sure how I came to know this, 
presumably I learnt it at school, or may be just before and either way 
through reading some authoritative text. But the specific route to that fact 
is not one I can retrace. When I stare at the white picket fence, though, I 
not only know that there is a white picket fence there, I seem to be in a po-
sition to tell how I can know that fact: it is made manifest to me in what I 
can see. Suppose, now, though, that I have been convinced by Hume that I 
am not in the kind of situation that I took myself to be in. It is not the 
white picket fence with which I am presented, but merely some simu-
lacrum of the fence, an impression or image. In this case, the fact that I was 
mistaken about how I thought I was in a position to know that that was a 
white picket fence seems to undermine my confidence in knowing this 
fact. So my epistemic standing will now be worse than what I took it be be-
fore I faced Hume’s challenge. I may complain that given the way that 
Hume claims sense experience to be it lacks the virtues that I conceived 
sense experience to have, for it does not give me the kind of cognitive con-
tact with the environment that I thought I had (even if it does, in fact, give 
me an alternative such form of contact). It is this contrast between how I 
conceived the cognitive advantages of my perceptual situation with how I 
supposedly learn them to be which warrants describing my newly discov-
ered situation as one involving a barrier.
The simple Cartesian story does not provide the materials to warrant 
talk of a barrier or veil here, for the simple story in itself makes no claim 
about the nature of experience. The rather different Humean challenge fo-
cuses on perception and contrasts how we believe it to be with how philos-
ophy can supposedly demonstrate it to be. This challenge does make 
intelligible why one could come think of sense experience as screening off 
the world from our cognitive contact with it. The two challenges take dif-
ferent forms and draw on rather different resources. There is no obvious 
move from one to the other.
It should already be obvious that the arguments discussed in Part One 
belong in a version of the Humean sceptical challenge. The disjunctivist is 
motivated by the need to block the argument from hallucination offered as 
an attack on naïve realism. The disjunctivist takes naïve realism to be the 
best philosophical articulation of what we all pre-theoretically accept con-
cerning the nature of our sense experience: that in veridical perception we 
are aware of mind-independent objects, and that the kind of experience we 52
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the experiential episode. If the argument from hallucination succeeds, then 
no aspect of our experience can be naïve realist. So, we could not be per-
ceptually related to the physical world in the way that we pre-theoretically 
take ourselves to be. If our pre-theoretical conception plays any role in our 
understanding of what we know about the environment around us, or that 
of how we are able to single out and think about the objects we do, then 
this falsification will threaten the kinds of sceptical consequence that 
Hume highlights. So we can see the naïve realist as a variation on Hume’s 
vulgar, and the argument from hallucination a development of Hume’s 
slightest philosophy. The disjunctivist seeks to block the challenge by re-
jecting the Common Kind Assumption.
But whether the disjunctivist can plausibly do this, we saw in Part Two, 
turns on one’s attitude towards the awareness we have of our own sensory 
states. One might think that in introspective reflection we adopt a perspec-
tive outside of phenomenal experience itself, a perspective through which 
we track or apprehend independently holding facts about how things are 
with us phenomenally. Conceiving of our awareness in this way, leads to 
viewing the disjunctivist as claiming that causally matching hallucinations 
are cases in which a subject lacks any sensory experience but is deprived of 
the capacity to detect that lack. In rejecting this accusation, the disjunctiv-
ist affirms a different picture of how self-awareness and phenomenal con-
sciousness interrelate. Our introspective access to our phenomenal 
experience contrasts with perceptual access to the world around us. In per-
ception, we have a viewpoint on what we perceive independent of the 
world we perceive: and hence that we come to know that the world is as it 
seems reflects a substantive cognitive achievement on our part. Within the 
mind, on the other hand, there is no such gap to be closed by the subject’s 
cognitive success. A subject’s perspective on his or her own experience is 
not distinct from their perspective on the world. So the disjunctivist does 
not characterise our lack of awareness of the absence of experience, but 
rather the way in which experience itself can simply be the lack of aware-
ness. When we consider a case of perfect hallucination, we conceive of a 
subject occupying a point of view on the world within which they do not 
succeed at all in latching on to or becoming aware of any aspect, but are 
rather deceived in a particular way, as if they perceived, for example, a 
white picket fence. 
But should we simply think of our self-conscious knowledge of experi-
ence in such a situation as giving us no substantive knowledge of anything 
independent of our context of enquiry? I’ve suggested that the fundamen-
tal disagreement with the disjunctivist lies in this question. Those who find 
disjunctivism incredible suppose it obvious that we just recognise intro-
spectively something which must be present in order to have experience, 53
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commitment that I want to suggest is connected with the Cartesian chal-
lenge, and which we might see as at work in the background of Stroud’s 
talk of a veil of sensory experience.
How does this line of thought develop? The first thing to note is that 
the disjunctivist, in embracing a naïve realist conception of veridical per-
ceptual experience claims that such mental states have as constituents the 
objects of perception. Secondly, as these are aspects of the veridical percep-
tual situation, the subject can attend to and form judgements about these 
as aspects of the experiential situation. So the subject does have knowledge 
of something independent of just occupying the perspective of seeming to 
be presented with a white picket fence, say. Moreover, that there is this as-
pect to veridical perception means that in the case of perfect hallucination 
it will seem to one as if one occupies the same sort of situation with respect 
to the world. That is to say, in having an hallucination one is not only de-
ceived with respect to the environment, that it seems as if certain kinds of 
objects are present in one’s environment, but also with respect to one’s ex-
perience, that seemingly one is in a position of experiencing this objects. In 
both situations, therefore, it will seem to one as if there is an aspect of the 
experience to which one can attend and about which one can acquire 
knowledge independent of the perspective one takes on it. That this should 
merely be a matter of how things seem and not how they are in the case of 
hallucination is not evident within the perspective one takes on one’s situ-
ation.
Turn now to the context of the Cartesian challenge. Before considering 
the challenge, one can see various items in the world around one, perhaps 
the fireplace, and the pages on which the challenge turns out to be written. 
One can not only see these things, but one knows through seeing them 
how one knows various things about them. Faced with the sceptical chal-
lenge, and, as yet without any ready answer to it, the situation that Stroud 
describes in the passage cited above, one may feel deprived of knowledge 
both of the elements in the world around one, and also the knowledge of 
how one’s experience can be giving one knowledge of these things. For af-
ter all, if the knowledge one has of how one’s experience provides knowl-
edge of the world exploits one’s recognition that the objects of perception 
are part of the experiential episode, then one cannot so recognise one’s ex-
perience when gripped by the sceptical puzzle. The best that one can know 
of one’s experience is just that it is not knowably distinct from the case of 
perceiving given one’s perspective on matters.
While one cannot reasonably exploit one’s knowledge of the objects of 
perception while in the grip of the Cartesian doubt, though, one need not 
thereby be deprived of the sense experience one has, or the ability to attend 
to its various elements, and hence attend to the objects of perception. It is 54
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tending to any object or coming to know anything about it. For all that one 
can know from this perspective, it might merely be the case that it seems to 
one as if one is attending without doing so.
Yet, if one surmises that even in the face of the sceptical challenge, one 
does have access to the knowledge that one is attending to something, and 
that through so attending one can learn things about it, then one can ex-
ploit one’s experiential situation to know things, at least with respect to 
one’s experience. Note that this is not merely to surmise that one is in a po-
sition to know that it seems to one as if certain objects are present. For, as 
we have underlined in discussion of disjunctivism, that things are this way 
with one does not require one to be in a position to discover further facts 
about some subject matter independent of the perspective of enquiry. But 
to conceive of oneself as properly attending to some objects and thereby 
learning about them in having the experience is to suppose that there is 
such a subject matter which one can learn about even in the context of the 
sceptical challenge. Of course, so to take oneself to have access to the ob-
jects of experience is to suppose that one would have the same kind of ac-
cess whether or not one is hallucinating. But the only things to which one 
could have such access, given how we specify the hallucinatory possibility, 
is if one’s occupying this subjective perspective would still guarantee the 
existence of appropriate objects of attention. The objects in question 
would then have to be suitably mind-dependent. This, of course, is incon-
sistent with our starting thought, that reflection on one’s sense experience 
supports a naïve realist construal of the nature of experience. That is, inde-
pendently of the sceptical challenge, we are inclined to suppose that our 
sense experience must be a presentation of a mind-independent world.
Indeed, the fact that our experience does manifestly present a mind-in-
dependent world, a feature of it immediately accessible to us when not in 
the grip of sceptical thoughts, may provide a motivation, albeit a self-de-
feating one, for conceiving of our introspective access to the subject matter 
of our sense experience as preserved even in the scope of the sceptical chal-
lenge would give one a ready and intuitive answer to the sceptical chal-
lenge. Before the sceptical challenge is raised, it seems as if there is a simple 
answer to the question, how do you know that there is a white picket fence 
there? After all, you can simply see that there is one there, and that you can 
see that one is there is something that you also have access to.49 For such 
quotidian examples of perceptually grounded knowledge you have a ready, 
if shallow, understanding of how you come by the knowledge. You seem 
both to be deprived of the knowledge and your understanding of it when 
in the grip of the sceptical challenge. So a response to the sceptic which 
49. Cf. here (Austin 1962), p.131.55
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ceived world would be one which did appeal to your reflective knowledge 
of your perceptions – that this just is a case of having a white picket fence 
made manifest. That it seems to you that your experience has this charac-
ter is not removed just by engaging with the sceptical challenge. So it is 
merely in the context of determining what such knowledge would have to 
be in order to give one an answer to the sceptical challenge that one is led 
to suppose that one’s reflection on one’s experience does give one substan-
tive knowledge, but just knowledge of something less than the objects of 
experience one took it to present.
To tell the story in these terms is to invite the reader into thinking of the 
sceptical argument as attracting one to something like the sense-datum 
theory of sensory experience. For we are to suppose that reflective atten-
tion to one’s experience will provide objects of awareness and knowledge, 
whether one is perceiving or hallucinating. Indeed, telling the story in just 
these terms seems to fit best both Stroud’s various ways of telling the story, 
and Smith’s original complaint (as we noted at the time). But it is also clear 
that disjunctivism is not the only alternative to a sense-datum theory of 
sense experience, one might well seek to deny that there must be objects of 
awareness when one hallucinates and yet insist that there is something ex-
periential present in cases of hallucination not captured by the disjunctiv-
ist’s commitment to (III).
At this point, I think, the disjunctivist can challenge back. In insisting 
that there must be something there in the case of hallucination which the 
subject can recognise to be present through introspection, and yet denying 
that it is any object of awareness, the theorist must suppose that the subject 
is, in effect, attending just to the fact that they are experiencing as such. 
That is, the intentionalist can differentiate his or her position from the 
sense-datum theorist only by exploiting the idea that we must have a dis-
tinct perspective on our inner lives from that we take in experiencing the 
world. This invites two comments. First, as we have noted in the discussion 
above on introspection, this picture is maintainable in conjunction with 
the widespread conviction that there is no seems/is distinction in relation 
to phenomenal consciousness only if the theorist commits to the existence 
of some perfect mechanism tracking the proper operation of introspec-
tion. Second, the insistence that there is, after all, something for the subject 
to know, that he or she is in this distinctive kind of state, still has the ele-
ment of attempting to rescue some substantial knowledge from the scepti-
cal challenge that the story we attached to Stroud does. Even if the result is 
described in slightly different terms, the motivation may well be the same. 
And even though the intentionalist avoids positing entities which could act 
as a veil, sense-data or images, still the view does not avoid the Humean 
problem if, as the disjunctivist argues, the conception of experience as 56
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ception of it.
So, the proposal on behalf of disjunctivism is this. When initially faced 
with the Cartesian sceptical challenge, and as yet lacking any direct answer 
to it, we are tempted to re-construe the kind of self-aware knowledge we 
have of our sense experience such that it is preserved even in the scope of 
the Cartesian sceptical doubt. This would require us to view the character 
of such experience in terms very different from our initial pre-reflective 
stance on it. When we recognise that, we are then subject to the Humean 
challenge. The disjunctivist succeeds in blocking Hume’s concerns only if 
they can intelligibly reject the Common Kind Assumption. Without a di-
rect answer to Cartesian scepticism, though, the required limitations on 
our knowledge of our own sense experience will seem counter-intuitive.
The unacceptability of disjunctivism indicates, on this account, not its 
failure to take seriously phenomenal experience or the nature of subjectiv-
ity. Rather, disjunctivism takes as seriously as one could the idea that a 
subjective perspective on the world need impose no specific objective con-
straints. Instead, the unacceptability lies in the intractability of certain 
sceptical puzzles, and our tendency in the face of them to preserve the little 
knowledge that we could have through reflection on our experience.50 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alston, William. 1989. Varieties of Privileged Access. In Epistemic 
Justification. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Original edition, 
American Philosophical Quarterly.
Anscombe, G. E. M. 1975. The First Person. In Mind and Language, edited 
by S. Guttenplan. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Armstrong, D.M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: 
Routledge.
Austin, J.L. 1962. Sense & Sensibilia. Edited by G. Warnock. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Burge, T. 1993. Vision and Intentional Content. In John Searle and his 
Critics, edited by R. v. Gulick and E. LePore. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell.
50. This paper was originally conceived as a contribution to a conference on disjunctivism organised 
by Marcus Willaschek and Tim Crane in March 2004. Charles Travis provided commentary on that 
occasion; a version was also presented to the NYU workshop in Florence in June 2004, with Alex Byrne 
and Susanna Siegel commenting. I wish to thank all three for their comments. Versions were also pre-
sented to a seminar in Harvard, to the Wittgenstein workshop in Chicago, and to a conference on self-
knowledge in Amiens. I am grateful to audiences at all events. I have also benefited from discussion of 
this material with Dave Chalmers, Jim Conant, Tim Crane, Tamar Szabó Gendler, Mark Eli Kalderon, 
Michael Kremer, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, Chris Peacocke, and Paul Snowdon.57
M.G.F. Martin———. 1996. Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society XCVI:108-110.
Burge, Tyler. 1977. Belief De Re. jp:338-362.
———. 1983. Russell’s Problem & Intentional Identity. In Agent, Language 
& the Structure of the World, edited by J. Tomberlin. Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Co.
Chalmers, David. 1996. The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Chisholm, Roderick. 1969. On the Observability of the Self. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 30:7-21.
Davidson, Donald. 1969. The Individuation of Events. In Essays on Actions 
and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Davies, Martin, and Max Coltheart. 2000. Introduction: Pathologies of 
Belief. Mind and Language 15 (1):1-46.
Dennett, DC. 1991. Consciousness Explained. New York: Little, Brown.
Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Edited by J. McDowell. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Fine, Kit. 1994. Essence and Modality. In Philosophical Perspectives, 8: Logic 
and Language, 1994, Tomberlin, James. Atascadero: Ridgeview.
———. 1994. Ontological Dependence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society:95 269-290.
Foster, J. 1986. A.J. Ayer. London: Routledge.
Foster, John. 2000. The Nature of Perception. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Heal, Jane. 1994. Wittgenstein and Moore’s Paradox. Mind 103:5-24.
Hinton, J. M. 1967. Visual Experiences. Mind:76 217-227.
Hinton, J. Michael. 1973. Experiences: An Inquiry into Some Ambiguities. 
Oxford: Clarendon Pr.
Jackson, F. 1977. Perception: A  Representative Theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Macdonald, Cynthia. 1998. Externalism & Authoritative Self-Knowledge. 
In Knowing Our Own Minds, edited by C. Wright, B. Smith and C. 
Macdonald. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mack, Ariel, and Irvin Rock. 1998. Inattentional Blindness. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Martin, M.G.F. 2001. Beyond Dispute. In The History of the Mind-Body 
Problem, edited by T. Crane and S. Patterson. London: Routledge.
———. 2002. Particular Thoughts & Singular Thought. In Logic, Thought, 
and Language, edited by A. O'Hear. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
———. 2004. The Limits of Self-Awareness. Philosophical Studies 120 
(1):37-89.58
On Being AlienatedMartin, MGF. 1997. The Reality of Appearances. In Thought and Ontology, 
edited by M. Sainsbury. Milan: FrancoAngeli.
———. 2002. The Transparency of Experience. Mind & Language 17 
(4):376-425.
McConkie, GW. 1979. On the role of and control of eye movements in 
reading. In Processing of Visible Language, I, edited by P. Kolers, M. 
Wrolstad and H. Bouma. New York: Plenum Press.
McDowell, John. 1982. Criteria, Defeasibility & Knowledge. Proceedings of 
the British Academy.
———. 1984. De Re Senses. pq.
———. 1994. Knowledge by Hearsay. In Knowing from Words, edited by B. 
K. Matilal and A. Chkrabarti. Amsterdam: Kluwer.
———. 1995. Knowledge and the Internal. Philosophy & 
Phenomenological Research LV:877-893.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1942. La Structure de comportement. Translated 
by A. Fisher. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Moran, Richard. 2001. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-
Knowledge. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Peacocke, CAB. 1983. Sense & Content. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1986. Thoughts: An Essay on Content. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
———. 1992. A Study of Concepts. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
———. 1998. Conscious Attitudes, Attention and Self-Knowledge. In Self-
Knowledge, edited by C. McDonald, B. Smith and C. Wright. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pitcher, George. 1971. A Theory of Perception. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Robinson, H. 1994. Perception. London: Routledge.
Robinson, Howard. 1985. The General Form of the Argument for 
Berkeleian Idealism. In Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial 
Celebration, edited by J. Foster and H. Robinson. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Shoemaker, S. 1995. Introspection & the Self. In Self-Knowledge, edited by 
Q. Cassam. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shoemaker, Sydney. 1984 (originally published Journal of Philosophy1968). 
Self-reference and Self-Awareness. In Identity, Cause and Mind. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1994. Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense". Philosophy & 
Phenomenological Research 64:249-314.
Smith, A. D. 2002. The Problem of Perception. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.59
M.G.F. MartinSnowdon, P.F. 1980-81. Perception, Vision and Causation. Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society.
———. 1990. The Objects of Perceptual Experience. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, supplementary vol. 64:121-150.
Strawson, PF. 1966. The Bounds of Sense. London: Methuen.
Stroud, B. 1984. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Stroud, Barry. 2000. Epistemological Reflection on Knowledge of the 
External World. In Understanding Human Knowledge. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. Original edition, 1996.
Sturgeon, Scott. The Epistemic View of Subjectivity. Journal of 
Philosophy:91(5) 221-235.
Valberg, J.J. 1992. The Puzzle of Experience. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Valberg, JJ. 1992. The Puzzle of Experience. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wiggins, David. 1980. Sameness and Substance. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
Ltd.
———. 1996. Substance. In Philosophy: A Guide through the Subject, 
edited by A. C. Grayling. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 2001. Sameness and Substance Renewed, Mind. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Williams, Bernard. 1978. Descartes: the Project of Pure Enquiry. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Williamson, T. 1995. Is Knowing a State of Mind? Mind 104:560-562.
Williamson, Timothy. 1990. Identity and Discrimination. Cambridge: 
Blackwell.
———. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. New York: Oxford Univ Pr.
Wright, Crispin. 1982. Strict Finitism. Synthese:51 203-282.
———. 1989. Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, 
Privacy, and Intention. Journal of Philosophy:86 622-634.
———. 1991. Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon. Mind
100 (1):87-116.
———. 1998. Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy. In Current 
Issues in Philosophy of Mind, O'Hear, Anthony. New York: 
Cambridge Univ Pr.60
